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THESIS

**DETECTING SPOILERS: PEACE ENFORCEMENT
OPERATIONS AND POLITICAL SETTLEMENTS TO
CONFLICT**

by

Nicole C. Manseau

March 2008

Thesis Advisor:

Jessica Piombo

Second Reader:

Raphael Biermann

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POLITICAL SETTLEMENTS TO CONFLICT**

Nicole C. Manseau
Captain, United States Air Force
B.A., American University, 1999

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
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**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
March 2008**

Author: Nicole C. Manseau

Approved by: Jessica Piombo
Thesis Advisor

Raphael Biermann
Second Reader

Harold A. Trinkunas
Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION.....	1
A.	CIVIL WAR IN AFRICA	1
B.	THE WESTERN RESPONSE.....	2
C.	PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS.....	4
D.	SPOILERS AND PEACE ENFORCMENT OPERATIONS	11
E.	METHODOLOGY	12
II.	SOMALIA	15
A.	BACKGROUND	15
B.	OPERATION RESTORE HOPE (1992-1993).....	19
C.	PEACE ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS AND THE SOMALI SPOILERS.....	31
III.	THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (DRC)	35
A.	BACKGROUND TO CONFLICT	35
1.	Civil War.....	35
B.	EU INTERVENTION.....	44
1.	French Instigation for Intervention	44
2.	EU Intervention and the UN Mandate.....	45
3.	Enforcing Peace.....	46
4.	Paving the Way for Political Settlement	49
C.	LESSONS LEARNED: OPERATION ARTEMIS AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION.....	50
IV.	CONCLU.S.ION	55
A.	DE TERRING SPOILERS.....	55
1.	Spoiler Theory	55
2.	The Somali and Congolese Spoilers.....	56
B.	POLICY IMPLICATIONS.....	67
	LIST OF REFERENCES.....	71
	INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	77

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. CIVIL WAR IN AFRICA

At the end of the Cold War, the global powers decided that sub-Saharan Africa was of waning strategic significance to the West. There was no longer a reason to wage proxy wars against Communism in Africa. Africa was no longer a security threat, but rather a wide-scale development project, and thus required economic rather than military aid. As the post-Cold War era progressed, however, Western nations came to grips with the fact that developmental projects in Africa were jeopardized by political instability and related outbreaks of civil war. Escalating conflicts led to dramatic humanitarian disasters and genocide, which spurred Western public demand for intervention to end the violence. Not wanting to risk their own troops, Western governments embarked on a strategy of supporting the development of African military forces that would deal with any emerging conflicts – the so-called “African solutions for African problems” strategy.

Unfortunately, several conflicts have evolved over the last decade, raising questions about whether African peacekeeping forces can adequately deal with such conflicts. Sierra Leone, Liberia, Darfur, Somalia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) are some examples of crises that African regional organizations could not solve by themselves. To begin with, the states supporting African organizations were not always willing or able to provide forces for peace support operations in a given conflict. Then, if forces were provided, they were not capable of resolving the conflict. To this day, African forces still suffer from a variety of political and military shortfalls. The West, on the other hand, has capable forces but suffers from political aversion to intervening in African conflicts. Above all, Western intervention often lacks legitimacy in the eyes of the combatants. Clearly, African forces cannot go it alone; but, at the same time, Western forces cannot arbitrarily intervene without local support.

These conflicts impact the lives of millions of Africans, resulting in high death tolls, numerous refugees, and enduring economic stagnation. Without mechanisms for successfully resolving these conflicts, they will continue to spread and destabilize the continent. Development efforts cannot gain purchase in such an environment. If the West wants to meet its objectives in Africa, most importantly democracy and

development, it must address the question of when and how it should contribute its own military forces to stabilizing conflict situations. If it does not, emerging conflicts in Africa run the risk of producing more Somalias: humanitarian disasters that devolve into complete statelessness and unchecked violence.

Given the limitations of both the African and Western mechanisms for conflict resolution, is there a format for intervention that could be more successful? Where, along the spectrum of peace support operations, should Western forces involve themselves in African conflicts? In this thesis, I will examine recent evolutions in Western-led peace enforcement operations in Africa and explore how they can best be utilized for sustained conflict resolution.

B. THE WESTERN RESPONSE

As there is a long history of Western interventions in African affairs, most of it colonial or neo-colonial, a large portion of existing literature deals with the foreign policies behind recent Western interventions. There is a broad consensus amongst academics that the foreign policies of Western states have been converging since the 1990s. Cold War-style proxy support gave way to humanitarian-motivated intervention in the early 1990s. Then, after the Somalia massacre in 1993, the U.S. in particular backed away from direct military intervention in Africa.¹ France, the most heavily involved in Africa, began to steer away from high-handed tactics designed to keep its client governments in power in Africa (i.e., counter-coup military actions).² Throughout the 1990s, Western states increased their economic focus and decreased their military involvement. After widespread condemnation for allowing the Rwandan genocide to occur, Western states realized that they could not remain completely detached from intervention – but they sought a less risky form of involvement in African crises.

Thus, in the latter half of the 1990s, the focus of the intervention debate shifted to the more indirect and less expensive option of developing African peacekeeping

¹ Donald Rothchild, “The U.S. Foreign Policy Trajectory on Africa,” *SAIS Review* 11, no. 1 (Winter-Spring 2001): 190-191.

² Asteris C. Huliaras, “The ‘Anglosaxon Conspiracy’: French Perceptions of the Great Lakes Crisis,” *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 36, no. 4 (December 1998): 606-8; Tony Chafer, “France and Senegal: The End of the Affair?” *SAIS Review* 23, no. 2 (Summer-Fall 2003): 165-6.

capabilities.³ Western states would train and equip peacekeepers under African regional and sub-regional security organizations to handle crises within the continent. Despite these efforts, Western-supported sub-regional interventions in Sierra Leone and Liberia failed, leading to massive United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions accompanied by direct UK and U.S. intervention. In other countries, UN ceasefire monitoring missions could only report that insurgent groups continued to fight, despite UN-brokered peace agreements. In the DRC, there was no sub-regional intervention force on hand to help the UN maintain the conflict resolution process.

One of these cases is recognized as an example of successful Western intervention: the European Union's (EU) Operation Artemis in 2003. In the DRC, the UN Mission in Congo (MONUC) forces monitoring a ceasefire arrangement between various rebel groups and government forces were insufficient to prevent rebels from continuing to kill civilians caught in their struggles for territory in the eastern province of Ituri. The UN was unable to reinforce its mission in eastern DRC, and the lack of a sub-regional partner forced the UN to appeal to the international community for assistance in May 2003.⁴ The EU rapidly deployed forces under Operation Artemis in June 2003, preventing the further slaughter of the inhabitants of the eastern town of Bunia and allowing the conflict resolution process begun by the UN to resume.⁵ The EU's quick response prevented rebel fighting in Ituri from destabilizing the peace process, allowing the UN to press forward with negotiations for a transitional government that year and, finally, free elections in 2006.

Another case, the 1993 U.S.-led Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, is a widely-criticized example of a failed Western intervention in an internal African conflict. In 1992, the UN mission to monitor a ceasefire between rival warlords in Mogadishu and deliver food aid to the general population was meeting severe resistance in. As the UN mission failed in late 1992, the U.S. led an emergency, UN-sanctioned task force

³ Daniel Bourmaud, "The Clinton Administration and Africa: A View from Paris, France," *Issue: A Journal of Opinion* 26, no. 2: 49-50; Jonathan Stevenson, "Africa's Growing Strategic Resonance," *Survival* 45, no. 4 (Winter 2003): 167.

⁴ Stale Ulriksen, Catriona Gourlay, and Catriona Mace, "Operation Artemis: The Shape of Things to Come?" *International Peacekeeping* 11, no. 3 (Autumn 2004): 510-1.

⁵ Fernanda Faria, "Crisis Management in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Role of the European Union," *The European Union Institute for Security Studies Occasional Paper* no. 51 (April 2004): 43.

(UNITAF) in early- to mid-1993, to enforce security in southern Somalia and ensure free movement of the food aid. After the deaths of eighteen American soldiers in Mogadishu operations in October 1993, the U.S. quickly wrapped up its involvement in Somalia and coerced the UN into doing the same. After three years of concerted effort to stabilize Somalia, the international community was forced to admit defeat in 1995. The U.S.-led coalition failed to buttress UN operations in Somalia, resulting in a collapsed peace process. To this day, Somalia continues to be wracked by political instability and its associated human suffering.

C. PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

The issue of Western intervention in Africa is part of the overarching debate over how peace support operations can be most effective in resolving conflicts around the world. This debate is broken down into two parts: how should “success” be measured for peace support operations, and what types of missions and force contingents contribute best to “success.”

1. Measuring Success

How to define the success of peace support operations is widely debated, but most scholars agree that the effectiveness of the military contingent is important insofar as it contributes to the overall success of the conflict resolution process. Robert Johansen takes a narrow view, focusing on whether or not the operations have a direct impact on halting fighting in their area of deployment. In this view, a peace support operation would be successful if it reduced fighting between the disputants and prevented civilian casualties until political negotiations could get underway.⁶ Following this line of thought, Patrick Regan dubs an operation successful if it halts fighting for at least six months.⁷

Taking a much more generalized view, Steven Ratner argues that peace support operations must positively impact a wide scope of issues surrounding the conflict, to

⁶ Daniel Druckman, et al., “Evaluating Peacekeeping Missions,” *Mershon International Studies Review* 41, no. 1 (May 1997): 157-8, 161.

⁷ Patrick M. Regan, *Civil Wars and Foreign Powers: Outside Intervention in Intrastate Conflict* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press), 14.

include improving human rights standards, military codes of conduct, and the overall humanitarian situation. The operations must create a net positive result for the disputants to the conflict, the people living in the conflicted area, the intervening forces, and all supporting organizations (such as the UN).⁸ Holding the middle ground, Diehl sets two conditions for a peace support operation to be considered successful: it must prevent a resumption of armed conflict between the disputants, and it must “facilitate a final, peaceful resolution to the dispute.”⁹

Finally, other scholars weigh the political settlement process more heavily than the military aspect of the operation. Bellamy and Williams offer indicators for success based on an inter-subjective understanding of conflict resolution: all parties must view the operation as legitimate and agree on what constitutes fulfillment of its mandate. Only then can a peace support operation contribute to conflict resolution.¹⁰ The end goal, conflict resolution, is also open to definitional debate. Indications that a conflict is considered resolved could be an end to violence for any specified period, but this is problematic because no one can guarantee that it will not resume at a later date. For this reason, Michael Doyle argues that the conflict resolution process must put in place a government of “self-sustaining self-determination:” a political settlement forged at the local level and enjoying consent and legitimacy on all sides. This outcome focuses more on developing an indigenous political framework than on the actions of the interveners. Without such self-determination, halting the violence is at best a short-term solution because the root causes of the conflict have not been addressed in a manner satisfactory to all the disputants.¹¹

2. Strategies

Further complicating the debate over the successfulness of peace support operations is the question of whether different types of operations should be judged by

⁸ Druckman, et al., 159.

⁹ Paul F. Diehl, “Peacekeeping Operations and the Quest for Peace,” *Political Science Quarterly* 103, no. 3 (Autumn 1988): 489.

¹⁰ Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, “Who’s Keeping the Peace? Regionalization and Contemporary Peace Operations,” *International Security* 29, no. 4 (Spring 2005) 161, 177-9.

¹¹ Michael W. Doyle, “War Making and Peace Making: The United Nations’ Post-Cold War Record,” in *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict*, eds. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2001), 543.

different indicators. Peace support operations (PSO) is a general term used to encompass the full spectrum of possible interventions intended to resolve a conflict. The spectrum ranges from peacekeeping missions on one end, to peace enforcement missions on the other; most missions fall somewhere in the middle, with characteristics of both types but leaning more toward one end of the spectrum. More than one type may also be used in any given conflict resolution process, but each is geared toward distinct goals.

Peacekeeping is defined by the UN as “involving military personnel but without enforcement powers, undertaken ... to help maintain or restore international peace and security in areas of conflict.”¹² Most scholars characterize peacekeeping missions as distinct from peace enforcement missions in that they enjoy the consent of all parties to the conflict, act impartially with respect to all parties to the conflict, and use military force only in self-defense.¹³ In short, traditional peacekeeping missions do not interfere one way or the other in the conflict, but only monitor compliance or non-compliance with negotiated ceasefires or other conflict settlement mechanisms.¹⁴

Since the end of the Cold War, the UN has faced a surge in the number of crises taking place at the intrastate level, such as civil wars. In such instances, peacekeeping was not sufficient to prevent the continuation of the conflict. International organizations have widened the strategy behind their interventions to reflect a conflict resolution model, which calls for “peacebuilding.”¹⁵ “Expanded” or “strategic” peacekeeping now occupies the middle of the intervention spectrum, with multifunctional missions including: refugee resettlement, establishing democratic governance in the country, institutionalizing civil society participation in the new democracy, and socio-economic development.¹⁶ This is a more sophisticated model of conflict resolution; it attempts to

¹² Trevor Findlay, *The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 3-4.

¹³ Ibid., 4.

¹⁴ Erwin A. Schmidl, “The Evolution of Peace Operations from the Nineteenth Century,” in *Peace Operations between War and Peace*, ed. Erwin A. Schmidl (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2000), 5-6; Doyle, 530; Paul F. Diehl, Daniel Druckman, and James Wall, “International Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution: A Taxonomic Analysis with Implications,” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42, no. 1 (February 1998): 39-40.

¹⁵ Diehl, Druckman, and Wall, 36.

¹⁶ Findlay, 5; Schmidl, 5-6.

resolve the root causes of the conflict through a political settlement process geared toward statebuilding, while using peacekeepers in their traditional role to monitor compliance with this process.

Peace enforcement missions, at the far end of the spectrum, pack more of a punch. They act to “induce one or more parties to adhere to a peace arrangement previously consented to by using means which include the use or threat of military force.”¹⁷ Peace enforcement missions can use their military power to coerce parties to the conflict to uphold the promises they made in conflict resolution negotiations, but not to help one side or another “win” the conflict through force of arms. Enforcement missions can include providing security for humanitarian aid delivery, preventing massacres of civilians by recalcitrant war leaders, and otherwise applying combat forces to ensure compliance with the terms of a political settlement.¹⁸

In contrast with peacekeeping missions, enforcement missions may operate without the express consent of the parties to the conflict; the rationale being that the parties consented to political settlement, and thus cannot object to being coerced into keeping the promises they made at the negotiating table. Enforcement missions evolved primarily to counter the negative effects of “persistent spoilers,” or parties to the conflict who cannot or will not live up to their responsibilities in a political settlement; in such cases military force may be the only method capable of preventing them from wrecking the entire conflict resolution process.¹⁹

Due to the different natures of peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions, different skill sets are required and different results are obtained in their use in the conflict resolution process. As such, there is a distinct difference in what types of forces contribute to the success (as defined above) of peace support operations. Below, I will lay out the key differences between peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions, followed by a synopsis of the debate over which types of forces are best suited to each.

¹⁷ Findlay, 6.

¹⁸ Schmidl, 5-6.

¹⁹ Bellamy and Williams, 183.

Peacekeeping missions are long-term, low-intensity operations that ideally continue until the conflict is completely resolved through political settlement. Negotiations must be far enough along so that a ceasefire is in effect, since peacekeepers are not equipped or mandated to engage in fighting. In addition to the ceasefire, all disputants must consent to the deployment of the monitoring troops and the interveners must maintain their neutrality amongst the disputants. In general, peacekeeping works best when the disputants are in a reconciliatory frame of mind; having reached a “hurting stalemate” in their fighting, they realize that their best bet is to accept third party mediation rather than to continue the conflict.²⁰ This is one example of “ripe moments” for intervention,²¹ times when the disputants believe that they can come out ahead in the conflict through a negotiated political settlement in which all parties benefit – an integrative settlement.²² The intervener must constitute a legitimate and strong authority in the eyes of the disputants in order for it to prescribe a long-term, in-depth, statebuilding process that the disputants will continue to follow.

Peace enforcement missions are in many ways the inverse of peacekeeping missions. When a ceasefire is not working, enforcement missions are called in to halt the fighting, using violence if necessary. Enforcers are actively coercing the disputants, and are thus engaged as a primary party rather than being a third-party mediator. The disputants are non-compliant with conditions of the negotiation process, and may be hostile toward the entire process. Factions may be incoherent, meaning that warring leaders either cannot or will not control their followers, who break the conditions of the political process.²³ Spoiler groups, as discussed above, threaten the possibility of conflict resolution. Significant factions believe that their best interests would be served by continuing fighting – they see the solution to the conflict being distributive (a zero-sum game) rather than integrative.²⁴ In these conditions, traditional peacekeepers would be easily overpowered or killed, and the peace process would fall apart.

²⁰ Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse, and Hugh Miall, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution* (Malden, MA: Polity, 2005), 166; Doyle, 547; Regan, 142.

²¹ Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall, 166.

²² Diehl, Druckman, and Wall, 37.

²³ Doyle, 547.

²⁴ Diehl, Druckman, and Wall, 37.

Clearly, a stronger military presence is required to make peace enforcement operations effective. A multilateral intervention may be ideal to monitor ceasefires and conduct other peacekeeping tasks, but it lacks several characteristics necessary to conduct stronger peace enforcement tasks. When peace enforcement requires intervening to halt fighting, a unilateral or coalition approach is arguably more appropriate.²⁵ Massive civilian casualties or other emergency situations call for a timely and robust initiation of peace enforcement operations. Questions of relative political will and military capability bog down international organizations and prevent effective intervention. If a single state or coalition of willing states decides that intervention in a particular crisis is needful, and the intervention is legitimized by an organization like the UN, then their resources will enable a more successful intervention. Given high salience to a single state or coalition of states, the conflict resolution process will benefit from the financial, logistical, combat, and command-and-control capabilities of Western states, in particular.²⁶

Regional security organizations may theoretically have a high degree of collective salience toward intervening in a local conflict because it more directly affects their own states, but in reality these organizations often suffer from the same political dithering as larger multinational organizations like the UN.²⁷ When regional or sub-regional organizations cannot agree on the salience of the operation, they lack the credibility and initiative necessary to enter into high-intensity peace enforcement operations. Unilateral or coalition operations, if offered, are in a better position to threaten recalcitrant disputants with coercion or rapid escalation, to include the possibility of military enforcement.²⁸ Even given high collective salience, regional organizations lack the money, military capabilities, and institutional capacity to conduct effective peace enforcement operations.²⁹

²⁵ Regan, 135.

²⁶ Findlay, 9; Regan, 150.

²⁷ Stephan F. Burgess, "African Security in the Twenty-First Century: The Challenges of Indigenization and Multilateralism," *African Studies Review* 41, no. 2 (September 1998): 57.

²⁸ David Carment and Dane Rowlands, "Three's Company: Evaluating Third-Party Intervention in Intrastate Conflict," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42, no. 5 (October 1998): 591-2.

²⁹ Doyle, 553; Bellamy and Williams, 170.

Multinational organizations (regional or international) are often viewed as more impartial and legitimate authorities than those constituting unilateral or coalition operations, and thus may be better suited to picking up the long-term peacekeeping mission and political process after the peace enforcement mission is accomplished.³⁰ A peace enforcement operation led by unilateral or coalition states must be careful to establish its legitimacy amongst the disputants and fellow conflict resolution actors – multinational organizations may fail to accomplish their follow-on peacebuilding missions if the transition from peace enforcement operations is uncoordinated.

Throughout these debates, the issues over how to define success in peace support operations and what types of operations are most efficient become intricately entangled. For that very reason, some argue that it is the strategy of intervention itself that most influences the success of peace support operations.³¹ In other words, the issues revolve around figuring out *what* type of peace support missions should be used (along the operational spectrum), *when* they should be used, and *who* should conduct them. Given that different missions might be used either simultaneously or in conjunction with other missions as part of one overarching conflict resolution process, should each mission be measured separately for its part in resolving the conflict? If the strategy behind the peace support operations is flawed, and the related missions are mutually incompatible, they may in fact be working against each other and ruining the conflict resolution process.³²

The question of how to measure the success of peace enforcement operations, as distinct from the wider scope of all peace operations supporting conflict resolution, remains unresolved. Ratner's and Diehl's measures of success for peace support operations are better suited to describing the overall success of the conflict resolution process than to specific peace enforcement missions. Creating a lasting resolution and improved conditions for all parties, as they argue, are criteria too broad to accurately measure the impact of a peace enforcement operation. Johansen's criteria, in contrast, are too narrow: completing a mandate to reduce fighting between disputants and protect civilian lives is not sufficient to make a peace enforcement operation successful. These

³⁰ Diehl, 504-5.

³¹ Regan, 141.

³² Diehl, 50.

measurements leave a gap between what a peace enforcement operation carries out and how this relates to the success of the larger conflict resolution process. In this paper, I will attempt to bridge this gap by measuring the success of peace enforcement operations as a function of whether or not they contribute to the progression of the peace process – the operations must do more than simply fulfill their mandates, but are also not wholly responsible for the endstate of the peace process.

D. SPOILERS AND PEACE ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS

A peace enforcement operation's ability to tackle spoilers, those parties to the conflict who actively sabotage the conflict resolution process, could potentially fill this gap between peace support operations and the success of the conflict resolution process. As discussed above, the conflict resolution process is especially impeded by the negative influence of factions that are numerous, internally incoherent, and/or hostile to the peace process. The case of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone provides an example of how a persistent spoiler group threatened to collapse the conflict resolution process. Bellamy and Williams' analysis suggests that it was the leadership of the United Kingdom, through its peace enforcement mission in 2000, which put the conflict resolution process there back on track. It did so by offering credible military opposition to the RUF, designated the primary spoiler group in the conflict resolution process.³³ Could this variable hold true across other case studies, explaining the success or failure of a peace enforcement operation within the conflict resolution process?

In order to avoid conflating the issues contributing to the success of peace support operations and that of the entire conflict resolution process, this thesis will analyze peace enforcement missions, a mission type that proved pivotal to the two operations mentioned above: Restore Hope in Somalia, and Artemis in the DRC. Peace enforcement operations such as these are particularly limited in scope – alone, they cannot provide conflict resolution. A host of alternate peacebuilding functions (political settlement between warring factions' demands, reconstruction, socio-economic development, etc.) must also occur before conflict resolution will succeed. Arguably, peace enforcement operations' most significant accomplishment lies in stabilizing the security situation so that the peace

³³ Bellamy and Williams, 180-3.

process may remain on track. Therefore, it may be unreasonable to measure the success of peace enforcement operations based on whether or not the entire peace process is ultimately successful.³⁴ At a much more basic level, peace enforcement operations must at least be able to carry out their mandate; if the mandate is appropriately tied to the political process, this will support the larger goal of conflict resolution. Given that unilateral or coalition forces seem to be more capable to conduct peace enforcement operations than international or regional multilateral forces, it remains unclear why even they do not always “succeed” in their mandate, let alone resolving the conflict.³⁵

In instances in which they were successful, such as the British role in breaking down rebel resistance in Sierra Leone, a key issue appears to be the intervener’s ability to tackle spoiler groups.³⁶ To test this variable, I will look at coalition peace enforcement operations’ relative success in enabling the forward momentum of the political settlement process; the criteria being how well they deter spoilers from sabotaging the conflict resolution process. My hypothesis is that the ability of a coalition to deter spoilers either enables or derails the progress of the political settlement process.

E. METHODOLOGY

I will examine case studies to test my hypothesis, using the method of difference. As the focus of this paper is on resolving African conflicts, my case studies will involve examples of peace enforcement operations in Africa. The two cases I will study are the U.S.-led intervention in Somalia (Operation Restore Hope, 1993) and the European Union intervention in DRC (Operation Artemis, 2003). These are two similar cases in that both involved Western-led coalitions attempting to provide limited physical security to a civil war-torn country in order to ameliorate horrific humanitarian conditions. In both cases, the interventions were part of a wider UN-led mission in the target country, which were to similar degrees stateless societies. In both cases, Western troops entered to prevent factions from killing civilians and to stabilize the security environment so that non-governmental organizations could distribute humanitarian aid. The independent

³⁴ Diehl, Druckman, and Wall, 50.

³⁵ Bellamy and Williams, 168-9.

³⁶ Ibid., 181.

variables in both cases were similar: direct action by Western coalitions to intervene in a civil war with a limited mandate supporting broader UN objectives. The dependent variables in these cases, however, widely diverged: in DRC, the mandate was achieved and the broader goals for conflict resolution were supported (the DRC remains a case in progress, but evidence to date supports progress toward conflict resolution); in Somalia, the U.S. and UN missions collapsed under the weight of their own failures and no broader stabilization goal was achieved. I will use within-case comparisons to examine the effects of the respective EU and U.S. interventions on the two conflict cases.

As discussed above, the independent variable will be measured by how well the peace enforcement mission is able to deter spoiler parties. Progress, the dependent variable, will be measured by the continuation of the operation's wider, political settlement goals (i.e., statebuilding activities, transition to democratic government, and so forth) as relevant to each case.

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II. SOMALIA

In my first case study, I will examine how peace enforcement operations failed to deter spoilers in Somalia, thus preventing progress from being made in the political settlement process. Operation Restore Hope proved unable to tackle spoilers due to several factors. First, problems associated with the mandate – differing conceptions of the mandate between the U.S. and the UN, and a shift in mandate as peace enforcement operations in Somalia transitioned to their final phase – prevented Operation Restore Hope from weakening the spoilers. Second, the disconnect between peace enforcement operations and the political settlement process precluded synergy in the peace process.

Finally, military operations had the unintended side effect of strengthening the primary spoilers to the peace process due to strategists' lack of understanding of Somali culture or power politics. All of these factors, when combined, prevented Operation Restore Hope from deterring Somalia's spoilers, allowing the spoilers to continue to derail the political settlement process and leave Somalia in a continuous cycle of conflict.

A. BACKGROUND

Following the ouster of Somalia's dictator, Siad Barre, in 1991, Somalia collapsed into a free-for-all struggle between various clans to control territory. Any hint of central authority or state structure, which had been supported by Western aid, completely disintegrated into customary clan and lineage structures that provided security to their members. Some clans retained grudges against others from years of divide-and-rule policies carried out during Siad's regime, and were seeking to regain prosperity after years of oppression. Weapons were widespread and access to food and other resources was zealously guarded by the clans controlling it. The two main economic prizes were the interriverine agricultural region in southern Somalia and the capital, Mogadishu, to its east.³⁷

Control over these two areas represented predominance amongst the clans and thus security for its members. The average Somali could only rely on his clan to channel resources to him; without clan alliances, he had no food, water, shelter, or security. This

³⁷ I.M. Lewis, *A Modern History of the Somali* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2002), 263-5.

lesson had been reinforced by Siad's rule, which had enriched his own clan at the expense of all the others. With Siad gone, no one wanted to be left out in the cold again. Each individual Somali understood that his/her very survival was inextricably linked to that of the clan, forming an 'attack against one is an attack against all' mentality amongst the clans.³⁸

The political frontlines in the struggle for southern Somalia lay between two rival clan leaders, Mohammed Farah Aideed and Ali Mahdi. Aideed headed the Habar Gidir sub-clan of the Hawiye clan, which had opposed Siad's Darod clan-based regime in southern Somalia. Mahdi, also a Hawiye, was head of a rival sub-clan, the Abgal. The Habar Gidir had recently won control over much of Mogadishu from the Abgal due to their strong military position in southern Somalia. Mahdi, however, claimed political legitimacy for his forces by proclaiming himself the president of Somalia. Added to the mix were multiple other clan leaders joined in destructive battles throughout Somalia. Because of the rampant destruction, looting, and massacres associated with their "armies," such clan leaders became known as warlords. The conflict between the warlords reached a new height in Mogadishu between 1991 and 1992. The city was split between three forces – Darod, Abgal, and Habar Gidir – each led by a charismatic military commander (Morgan, Mahdi, and Aideed, respectively) and driven by the impetus to take over the whole city and its spoils of war. Before the arrival of international forces, about 14,000 people had already been killed in the battle for Mogadishu.³⁹

3. Rival Factions and Humanitarian Disaster

In parallel to the political fragmentation, socio-economic disasters were also destroying Somali lives in horrific numbers. The fighting in the interriverine agricultural zone led to crops being destroyed and farmers killed, so that 300,000 Somalis died from the resulting famine.⁴⁰ Humanitarian aid agencies rallied to the plight of starving Somalis, but their efforts were also impeded by heavy fighting and parochial clan

³⁸ Anna Simons, *Networks of Dissolution: Somalia Undone* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), 197-8.

³⁹ Lewis, 264-5.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

interests. Food relief was just another source of revenue to the warlords, one that could back their military efforts against the other clans. In a way, food aid exacerbated the collective security dilemma already existing between the clans. Warlords charged international relief agencies 10-20% tariffs on their supplies before they would allow them to transit their territories to reach famine victims.⁴¹ Mogadishu became an even bigger prize, as the majority of distribution infrastructure being used by relief efforts was centralized in that city. Controlling relief efforts made the difference between life and death for both the warlords and their subjects.

4. International Intervention (1992-1995)

This is the context under which the UN intervened in Somalia. After more than a year, the UN had finally succeeded in brokering a ceasefire agreement between Mahdi and Aideed in March 1992.⁴² The humanitarian aid tap would be turned on for Somalia, but be monitored by UN observers to ensure its safe delivery to famine victims. In April 1992, UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 751 authorized the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). Its mandate was to protect relief operations aimed at approximately 1.5 million starving Somalis. The original deployment contained only fifty ceasefire monitors, but by November, the UN deployed about 3,500 armed troops in response to reports of inadequate protection for the convoys.⁴³ U.S. and European transports airlifted food aid starting in August 1992, but its dissemination to needy Somalis continued to be blocked by Mahdi and Aideed. By November, the ceasefire was in tatters as fighting in Mogadishu resumed, famine was out of control, and UNOSOM could not live up to the UN's mandate.⁴⁴

Enter the CNN effect: Americans could not stomach the plight of the Somali people, and demanded more direct U.S. action. The UN reported 300,000 dead and 1.5 million at risk from famine. With 700,000 refugees spilling over into neighboring countries, the Somali crisis constituted "a threat to international peace and security."⁴⁵

⁴¹ Lewis, 267.

⁴² Lester H. Brune, *The U.S. and Post-Cold War Interventions* (Claremont, CA: Regina Books, 1998), 13.

⁴³ Lewis, 267.

⁴⁴ Brune, 18-9.

⁴⁵ "Operation Restore Hope." *UN Chronicle* 30:1 (March 1993), 14.

President George Bush authorized 28,000 American troops under Operation Restore Hope to lead a multinational force in bolstering security conditions in southern Somalia so that food aid could be delivered. On 3 December 1992, UNSCR 794 approved the United Nations Task Force (UNITAF) concept, authorizing member countries to offer an additional 9,000 troops. UNITAF provided the threat of credible force so that aid shipments would no longer be impeded.⁴⁶ Significantly, UNSCR 794 called for Chapter VII operations, recognizing that there was no legitimate state government in Somalia which could either request or deny UN operations there.⁴⁷ The wishes of the warlords, theoretically- and legally-speaking, were immaterial to what the UN chose to do in Somalia.

Practically-speaking, however, the cooperation of Mahdi and Aideed would be crucial to the success of the mission. UNITAF brokered another ceasefire between the two warlords once it arrived, allowing UNITAF forces to spread out within southern Somalia. The force gained control over the Mogadishu airport and seaport, as well as the key roads linking these ports with eight major cities in the South. In doing so, it protected the delivery of food aid to the tune of 100,000 lives saved. It stabilized the security situation in the South, then quickly withdrew, handing a simmering Mogadishu back over to the UN proper in May 1993.⁴⁸

The renewed UN peacekeeping and humanitarian aid mission, dubbed UNOSOM II, assumed that the relative security would last and shifted its focus to state-building. Aideed decided to no longer cooperate with intervention forces, however, and the UN was swiftly caught up in containing his aggressions. In June, attempts to close down Aideed's anti-UN propaganda machine and to inventory his weapons depot led to a battle in which 24 Pakistani peacekeepers were killed. Aideed also seized the UN food distribution warehouse in Mogadishu. The UN responded with UNSCR 837, which shifted the focus of UNOSOM II forces to disarming the warlords' militias. Assisted by U.S. special operations forces remaining in Mogadishu, UN forces tracked Aideed between June and October of 1993, believing that if they arrested him, attacks against UN

⁴⁶ Brune, 19-21.

⁴⁷ Lewis, 268.

⁴⁸ Brune, 23-4.

forces would halt. Finally, on October 3, the infamous “Black Hawk Down” assault on Aided’s location resulted in the deaths of 18 U.S. service members and widespread media attention. The political backlash caused the U.S. to withdraw its forces by March 1994; the UN was forced to do the same by March 1995.⁴⁹

B. OPERATION RESTORE HOPE (1992-1993)

What did the international community aim to achieve by intervening in the Somalia crisis in 1992? It soon became clear that not only did the populace need food aid, but it also needed someone to ensure that it bypassed the warlords and actually reached the people. That was precisely why UNITAF was conceived, but why did it not work? Surely 28,000 American troops could handle a little convoy duty? In fact, they could, and they did. While they had their share of problems, military operations did not doom the mission in Somalia.

The Somalia intervention was problematic because it was an attempt to solve a political problem militarily. In hindsight, it has been recognized that humanitarian crises caused by war cannot be solved by humanitarian relief alone. The political situation that engendered the humanitarian crisis must be dealt with simultaneously – thus tackling the root causes of conflict instead of just treating the symptoms.⁵⁰ In the case of Somalia, the famine wasn’t spread primarily by natural disaster, but instead by the collapse of the state into civil war and the complete breakdown of political institutions.⁵¹ When, in UNITAF and UNOSOM II, the international community embarked upon peace enforcement operations, it was following a conflict abeyance model based on separating the factions – by force if necessary – to protect the lives of Somali civilians. Peace enforcement operations, however, cannot *make* peace. In order to actually end the humanitarian crisis, the international community needed to address the longer-term, underlying causes of the conflict alongside their short-term political-military operations.⁵²

⁴⁹ Brune, 27-33.

⁵⁰ John G. Fox, “Approaching Humanitarian Intervention Strategically: The Case of Somalia,” *SAIS Review* 21:1 (Winter-Spring 2001), 147.

⁵¹ Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, eds., *Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), 13.

⁵² Clarke and Herbst, 4; Ramesh Thakur, “From Peacekeeping to Peace Enforcement: The UN Operation in Somalia,” *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 32:3 (September 1994), 401.

In 1992, there was no long-term plan for Somalia and even the short-term plan demonstrated a decided lack of congruence between peace enforcement operations and the political peace process. The differing interpretations of UNITAF's mandate between the U.S. and the UN, as well as the mandate's shift from convoy protection to enforcing peace-building operations under UNOSOM II, prevented military operations from deterring spoilers like Aideed. In some cases, UNITAF actually strengthened spoilers due to planners' misunderstanding of Somali power politics. Even when successful on a tactical level, peace enforcement operations failed to support the political process. As the lessons learned from intervention in Somalia demonstrate, failure to deter spoilers leads to a failure to complete a political settlement process and end conflict.

1. Mandate Problems

The one statement that best describes the political ignorance behind the Somalia intervention is President George Bush's remark that U.S. operations there would be "purely humanitarian."⁵³ While the initial UN intervention had been conceived in those terms, from day one, operations on the ground had taken on political overtones. Monitoring a ceasefire and escorting aid deliveries evolved into a more ambitious UN mandate for UNOSOM I: providing humanitarian aid, peacemaking, peacekeeping, statebuilding, settling political disputes, and conducting an arms embargo.⁵⁴ The lack of progress on the political front (which I will discuss further below) prompted the UN to beef up the military front with UNITAF in December 1992. The U.S. would lead UNITAF in protecting food distribution, a narrow mandate not shared by the UN nor tied to the political process, and one that would shift over time.

Without any appreciation for the political failures underpinning UNOSOM I's ineffectiveness, or how UNITAF would inherit them, President Bush sent in what he viewed as a strictly humanitarian operation.⁵⁵ The U.S., after all, had no national security interest in Somalia at the time, so Bush did not consider interfering with Somalia's internal political problems. Instead, in the U.S. vision, UNITAF would ensure that the food aid reached the famine victims, then withdraw with all due speed, without

⁵³ Fox, 149.

⁵⁴ Brune, 17.

⁵⁵ Brune, 19.

consideration for how its operations might have affected Somali political life.⁵⁶ In contrast, the UN had much loftier goals for UNITAF: Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali claimed the force would “feed the starving, protect the defenseless and prepare the way for political, economic, and social reconstruction.”⁵⁷ While the U.S. concentrated on tactical objectives designed to prevent warlord attacks on aid convoys, the UN was talking about a more strategic goal of destroying the warlords’ power base and stabilizing the security situation for the long term. Boutros-Ghali started talking about UNITAF being responsible for disarming all the warlords’ militias, but the U.S. believed that such political goals were best left to UNOSOM II and criticized the UN for trying to promote UNITAF “mission creep.”⁵⁸ Somalis, themselves, seem to have expected UNITAF to remove the warlords, which would enable them to restart their political process and establish a civilian government.⁵⁹

The U.S. stuck to its tactical, military objectives throughout Operation Restore Hope. The U.S. felt constrained to do so, because from the onset the operation had been planned to make use of U.S. military strengths rather than to further UN political goals. President Bush had chosen the strongest military response option, reasoning that overwhelming military force would cow the warlords into submission. As a result, U.S. military planners tagged the Marine Corps as one of the key force providers for the operation – but the intensive nature of Marine operations means that deployed units could only be used in a short-term capacity. The planners also removed vital civil affairs and military police force packages from the operational order for Restore Hope because these units implied a longer-term commitment they wished to avoid.⁶⁰ Bush wanted the U.S. to leave Somalia quickly, and by using the forces he did, he made that goal a practical necessity.

Once UNITAF forces were deployed in Somalia, they failed to appreciate how their actions affected the warlords and thus counteracted the UN’s nascent political process. The head of UNITAF’s “diplomatic staff,” Robert Oakley, only negotiated

⁵⁶ Brune, 20.

⁵⁷ “Operation Restore Hope,” 13.

⁵⁸ Brune, 25; Fox, 154.

⁵⁹ Lewis, 277; Clarke and Herbst, 13.

⁶⁰ Clarke and Herbst, 9.

with the warlords in order to exact guarantees from them that they would not attack UNITAF forces spreading throughout Mogadishu. UNITAF exercised no other political mandate.⁶¹ Thus, while UNITAF succeeded in restraining the warlords with the threat of overwhelming military force, it did not provide them with political incentives to give up fighting altogether. The most powerful militia commander, Aideed, felt particularly endangered by UNITAF forces – but with UN political efforts completely divorced from UNITAF’s military mandate, he saw no way to translate his military strength into political concessions.⁶² Aideed felt he had no option but to ensure U.S. withdrawal before he lost what power he had left.

As the U.S.’s scheduled withdrawal approached with the end of UNITAF’s mandate in May 1993, tensions between the U.S. and the UN heightened with regard to UNITAF’s mandate. The UN expected UNITAF to have stabilized the security environment in southern Somalia to the extent that UNOSOM II’s political goals would be achievable. Accordingly, the UN expected UNITAF to disarm the militias, undercut the warlords, stabilize security both inside and outside of Mogadishu, and establish an internal security apparatus.⁶³ Simply put, the UN wanted UNITAF to fix the warlord problem so that UNOSOM II would not have to deal with it anymore. The U.S. was not willing, or able, to do this. Disagreements between the U.S. and the UN over whether UNITAF would use its military strength to stabilize the security situation in Somalia prevented UNITAF forces from taking on the warlords and cutting off their ability to block the political peace process.

UNITAF interpreted the mandate to establish internal security forces as orders to create a police force at the local level – but attempting to do so from the bottom-up without a parallel effort to establish a political structure meant that this mandate was doomed to fail.⁶⁴ UNITAF’s internal security apparatus ended up as militia “police”

⁶¹ Fox, 151.

⁶² Stephen F. Burgess, “African Security in the Twenty-First Century: The Challenges of Indigenization and Multilateralism,” *African Studies Review* 41:2 (September 1998), 49; Clarke and Herbst, 10.

⁶³ Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, *The Comprehensive Report on Lessons Learned from the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM)* (New York: United Nations, 1995), 6; Brune, 21-2.

⁶⁴ Brune, 25.

forces empowered to help their warlords crack down on the populace. By narrowly interpreting its mandate and neglecting to tie it to the political process, UNITAF failed to undercut the warlord spoilers. When UNITAF withdrew, it blithely claimed that there was no longer a clan warfare problem. Unfortunately, the UN's political process was not far enough along to establish a civilian government in May 1993.⁶⁵ With the withdrawal of UNITAF forces, Mogadishu became a military vacuum set to further destabilize the UN's political mandate. The warlords were free to subvert the political process, as they had been doing before UNITAF's arrival.

According to the UN Security Council, UNOSOM II's mandate was to "provide humanitarian and other assistance to the people of Somalia in rehabilitating their political institutions and economy and promoting political settlement and national reconciliation," by creating "conditions under which Somali civil society may have a role"⁶⁶ UNOSOM II would be attempting peacemaking and statebuilding, a much larger task, but with less combat capability than UNITAF. In addition to its fewer total troop numbers, UNOSOM II's emphasis on engineering and other statebuilding forces meant that they had drastically fewer peace enforcement troops at their disposal. While UNITAF had held a credible threat for the warlords, UNOSOM II just did not have the same coercive power.⁶⁷

Despite its Chapter VII mandate, UNOSOM II fell into the same quandary regarding the use of force that UNITAF had. Peace enforcement operations, by their very nature, do not require the consent of all parties to the conflict. Nevertheless, UNOSOM II continued to court Aideed's favor in hopes of pacifying him; they had too limited a capability to coerce or constrain him, but too heavy a presence for neutral peacekeeping.⁶⁸ At the same time, the U.S. restricted UNOSOM II's rules of engagement to Chapter VI-style peacekeeping rather than the mandated Chapter VII peace enforcement, hoping to reduce friendly casualties. The warlords quickly learned that the UN lacked the teeth to compel compliance.⁶⁹ If Aideed could simply keep the

⁶⁵ Brune, 27.

⁶⁶ "30,000-Strong UN Force Steps in to 'Restore Hope,'" *UN Chronicle* 30:2 (June 1993), 14.

⁶⁷ Brune, 28.

⁶⁸ Thakur, 399.

⁶⁹ Clarke and Herbst, 10-3.

UN, and most importantly the U.S. elements of UNOSOM II, off his back until the initial deployment expired in October 1993, he would prove the ineffectiveness of the intervention.

Aideed went one step farther, however, to ensure that all Western forces would withdraw, using a series of carefully planned attacks and counterattacks against UN forces that culminated in the Mogadishu Massacre in October 1993. Following increasingly fatal attacks against UN personnel attempting to inspect Aideed's weapons stores and other facilities, the UN reiterated its intention to disarm all parties in accordance with the political process and authorized the use of force to prevent the warlords from further attacks on UN personnel.⁷⁰ Due to its military weaknesses, the UNOSOM II mandate seemed to have shifted from the political process to force protection. Initiatives to destroy Aideed's ability to hurt UN personnel backfired, American troops were ambushed while attempting to capture Aideed on October 3, and the U.S. announced its withdrawal from Somalia.

Without U.S. leadership in Somalia, the UN did not have the resources or international consensus to build a revised plan for neutralizing the stranglehold of the warlords – the UN finally had to realize that the warlords were not genuinely interested in the political process underway to rebuild the Somali state. When U.S. withdrawal became public knowledge, the security situation in Mogadishu further destabilized and the peace process collapsed.⁷¹ For both pragmatic and political reasons, UNOSOM II's mandate shifted again: it renounced its strategy to capture Aideed, kept its forces out of harm's way, and half-heartedly concentrated on political reconciliation until its departure in March 1995.⁷² Without the strength of the U.S.-led UNITAF forces, UNOSOM II did not even attempt to deter spoilers by weakening the warlords. In the last year of its mission, UNOSOM II acknowledged the *fait accompli*: its mission was once again limited to monitoring ceasefire agreements between Aideed and Mahdi. Now comprised of only Third World troop contingents,⁷³ UNOSOM II was a specter of its former self

⁷⁰ Brune, 30.

⁷¹ Lewis, 268-78.

⁷² Brune, 33.

⁷³ Lewis, 274.

and an obvious indicator that the warlords had won the battle of wills – their commitment to continue fighting won out over the U.S.’s unwillingness to absorb casualties.⁷⁴

2. Coordination with the Political Process

As envisioned in December 1992, Operation Restore Hope was premised on the idea that providing food aid to starving Somalis would end their suffering. For various political and military reasons, as mentioned above, the U.S. was not willing or able to commit to anything more. The UN, however, already had loftier goals for solving the Somalia problem. Even as the UN announced UNSCR 794, authorizing the UNITAF deployment, it portrayed the mission as just one step in a conflict resolution framework. According to the UN, UNITAF would “use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia ... to restore peace, stability, and law and order with a view to facilitating the process of political settlement.”⁷⁵ But how precisely would humanitarian relief operations contribute to a future political settlement? It was already clear in December 1992 that famine was not the root of the Somalia catastrophe claiming so many lives. The disconnect between UNITAF’s mandate and the political process prevented the peace enforcement operation from deterring the spoilers.

Indeed, the legacy of international intervention in Somalia has proven that the provision of humanitarian aid had absolutely no positive impact on the conflict resolution process. In point of fact, humanitarian relief operations worked against conflict resolution by strengthening the warlords. Without the warlords’ cooperation, UNITAF troops could not deploy throughout southern Somalia to provide security for the aid convoys. At the same time, international cooperation with the warlords strengthened their political positions, both domestically and internationally, as evidenced by their increased stature as political representatives at the Addis Ababa talks. Humanitarian relief operations proved contradictory to the political peace process being road-mapped by the UN during 1992-1993, precisely because the objectives of Operation Restore Hope

⁷⁴ Thakur, 397.

⁷⁵ Jane Boulden, *Peace Enforcement: The United Nations Experience in Congo, Somalia, and Bosnia* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001), 58.

made the parties to the conflict less inclined to cooperate with a negotiated settlement to the conflict. The short-term objectives for providing food aid trumped the long-term goal of a political peace process.⁷⁶

Peace enforcement operations cannot resolve conflicts, but rather enable conflict resolution by fostering an environment conducive to political negotiations. The conflict in Somalia was political in nature, so a successful international intervention would have to deal with those political problems rather than provide the means by which the belligerents could continue to fight. In short, peace enforcement operations must deal with spoilers to conflict resolution – in the Somali context, this would mean undercutting the warlords and empowering actors committed to conflict resolution. Operation Restore Hope negated the political peace process by instead empowering the warlords in its consuming drive to provide food aid. Its mission was in no way geared toward setting the conditions for a negotiated settlement, and its military strength was not applied toward legitimizing the political peace process in the eyes of the Somalis.⁷⁷

While the most visible causes of the failure of international intervention in Somalia were military, the most substantive failures were political. The political and military mandates had not been well linked, but above and beyond that problem was the complete lack of progress in political reconciliation between 1992 and 1995. Initial efforts to start a political dialogue were established by the UN Special Representative to Somalia, Mohammed Sahnoun, in October 1992. He worked to bring representatives of clans and sub-clans together to create an agenda for future political reconciliation meetings.⁷⁸ His initial successes were interrupted by the new UNITAF leadership, which rewarded the military threat of the warlords by allowing them to attend as the twelve “political movement” representatives at the Addis Ababa talks in January 1993. While the UN General Assembly wanted the political process to culminate in a “final, comprehensive, politically negotiated settlement among all the political entities and

⁷⁶ John Hillen, *Blue Helmets: The Strategy of UN Military Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 2000), 174.

⁷⁷ Donald Rothchild, “The U.S. Role in Managing African Conflicts,” in *African Conflict Resolution: the U.S. Role in Peacemaking*, eds. Chester A. Crocker and David R. Smock (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995), 48.

⁷⁸ Brune, 18.

segments of the Somali people,”⁷⁹ it seemed safer to take the short-term solution of dealing with the warlords given the fact that UNITAF’s military muscle was preparing to depart in May.⁸⁰ Unsurprisingly, no political progress was made and the warlords continued to fight.

The second Addis Ababa meeting benefited from a rare alignment of UN political and military strategy. In March of 1993, Mogadishu was experiencing a temporary reprieve from fighting due to the heavy UNITAF presence. UN diplomats took advantage of this fact to jump-start the peace process.⁸¹ For once, cross-cutting civil society elements were included in the negotiations, although only during the humanitarian relief portions of the conference. The “National Reconciliation” portion of the conference was still dominated by what the UN viewed as the *de facto* leaders of Somalia: the warlords of the major clans. Accordingly, the militia leaders approved a charter for a Transitional National Council (TNC) comprised of 57 councilors to be drawn from the militia factions and other social groups. There were no mechanisms specified for ensuring that social groups at the regional levels would be duly incorporated,⁸² and the warlords were asked to voluntarily disarm their militias.⁸³

Time seemed to be working against the Addis Ababa conference, and for the warlords, on two levels: the imminent departure of UNITAF led the warlords to believe that they could wait out the UN intervention and in fact use it to their advantage, while the short timetable set by the UN for the peace process favored a political settlement too speedy to properly integrate the warlords’ possible opposition, civil society.⁸⁴ In their haste to establish District Councils (precursors to the creation of the TNC), the UN sponsored candidates who lacked the support of traditional clan elders in their regions, thus alienating the most powerful actors in civil society from the reconciliation process.⁸⁵

⁷⁹ “Operation Restore Hope,” 16

⁸⁰ Brune, 25.

⁸¹ Lewis, 270.

⁸² Brune, 26.

⁸³ “30,000-Strong,” 17.

⁸⁴ Clarke and Herbst, 13.

⁸⁵ Maria H. Brons, *Society, Security, Sovereignty and the State: Somalia* (Utrecht, Netherlands: International Books, 2001), 236.

In addition, the warlords had no incentives to disarm, per the agreement, because those who did so risked facing enemies being resupplied by illegal arms shipments. Over the course of the next two years, both Aideed and Mahdi continued to claim that they were obeying the Addis Ababa guidelines for disarmament but no substantive changes occurred in the political environment. The UN and the U.S. became increasingly embroiled in punishing Aideed for his attacks on UN personnel, and the political agenda gradually fell by the wayside.

Ironically, the political reconciliation process seemed to be more successful in the areas untouched by UN intervention. In Puntland, in northeastern Somalia, clans allowed traditional clan elders to mediate their differences and help build a local administration peacefully. In Somaliland, in the Northwest, traditional clan leaders were successful in overcoming sub-clan rivalries through the use of customary peace conferences (*shir*). The *shir* model has proven more effective than the UN-sponsored reconciliation model in the south, in large part because it does not channel Western money into the pockets of attendees.⁸⁶ The *shir* model has been proposed as an alternative forum for building a new Somali state: if it could be offered at the national level, at a neutral site guaranteed by third-party security, it could embrace a broad sector of civil society. This would allow all the opposition forces with a stake in Somalia's political future to come together as equals, instead of being dominated by the warlords' military forces.⁸⁷ As it was, however, follow-through on the Addis Ababa agreement stalled when the UN announced its intention to leave Somalia. Once again, intervention forces felt forced to negotiate with the warlords in order to safeguard their transit through Mogadishu⁸⁸ – this time, as they left for good. The warlords maintained the upper hand, and the political process stalled.

3. Strengthening the Somali Spoilers

UNITAF also failed to deter the spoilers to the peace process by chronically misunderstanding the operational environment in Somalia, which had the unfortunate effect of strengthening the warlords instead of weakening them. International diplomats

⁸⁶ Lewis, 265-6.

⁸⁷ Clarke and Herbst, 13.

⁸⁸ Lewis, 274.

and military officers, even those who made the most sincere efforts to solve Somalia's political crisis, were constantly hampered by their poor understanding of how Somali culture works. Between Siad's ouster and the beginning of the intervention, the U.S. had just one Foreign Service Officer monitoring events in Somalia from Nairobi.⁸⁹ Needless to say, the decision-makers behind Operation Restore Hope did not have the most current or comprehensive information about the social, political, or military situation that U.S. troops would face on the ground in Mogadishu.

But even the seemingly "age-old" aspects of Somali culture seemed beyond the ken of Western planners. Just as their ancestors had continually moved on in pursuit of better pastures, contemporary Somalis are continually reshaping their social structure to adapt to changing circumstances. A key aspect of this dynamism surfaced during the international intervention: sub-clan rivalries for resources, like that between Aideed's Habar Gidir and Mahdi's Abgal branches of the Hawiye, were swept aside when they felt more threatened by foreign forces.⁹⁰ The contours of the conflict shifted once UNITAF brought in overwhelming force – instead of dividing the militias and forcing them to the bargaining table for a real political settlement, UNITAF and UNOSOM II served to unite their followers against the foreign troops.

The concept of a neutral intervention also did not survive the journey from New York to Mogadishu. In an environment characterized by inter-clan rivalries, negotiating with clan leaders automatically lends the taint of partiality. After UN Special Representative Sahnoun developed a working relationship with Aideed, in order to safeguard arriving UN forces and convene the first political meeting, Sahnoun was replaced by a new representative, Kittani. Aideed refused to work with Kittani because Kittani was not felt to be as cooperative as Sahnoun had been. Aideed also believed that the UN backed Mahdi as the primary candidate for the future presidency of a restored Somalia, based in large part on the Organization of African Unity's endorsement of Mahdi. Aideed's perception that UN favor was shifting from him to Mahdi led him to refuse to disarm his militia and later declare war on UN forces.⁹¹

⁸⁹ Fox, 148-50.

⁹⁰ Simons, 203-4.

⁹¹ Brune, 18-25.

Diplomats also failed to understand that the very act of negotiating with the warlords lent those warlords legitimacy in the eyes of the Somali population. When UN operations were predicated on ceasefires brokered between Aideed and Mahdi, the UN was in reality legitimizing the warlords as political leaders. Making the warlords the stars of the peace conferences in Addis Ababa only further consolidated their hold on political power in Somalia. The peace process ground to a halt whenever fresh fighting broke out between clan militias in southern Somalia, giving the impression that the warlords controlled the peace process itself. UN-sponsored reconciliation meetings in Nairobi and other places supplied the warlords with bountiful patronage opportunities for their supporters, prestige, and foreign aid.⁹² UN funds, intended for the Somali people, instead worked to “line certain pockets, accord select individuals’ power, create new inequities, and breed all sorts of suspicions.”⁹³ Aideed even managed to make money by leasing stolen property to the UN in Mogadishu – a situation which outraged the legal owners from other clans.⁹⁴ Somalis could only come to one conclusion: one of these warlords would be supported by the UN as the next leader of all of Somalia, so they had better fight harder to ensure that it would be their warlord.

Co-opting political legitimacy and economic aid were not the only arenas in which the warlords proved themselves to be savvy, “astute entrepreneurs.”⁹⁵ Once Aideed felt himself being cut out of the UN consultation loop in Mogadishu, he reinvented his image as the defender of the Islamic faith from foreign occupation. Aideed made good use of the low-tech tools he had at his disposal, broadcasting messages about UN colonialism over Radio Mogadishu. His public relations campaign had significant success in damaging the UN’s image and bolstering his own as the only authentic leader of the Somali people. The more the UN demonized him as an enemy of the people, the more support he garnered from the populace at large. He translated the threat from the UN as against his entire sub-clan (and to a lesser extent, against all

⁹² Clarke and Herbst, 10-2.

⁹³ Simons, 207.

⁹⁴ Lewis, 279.

⁹⁵ Ibid., 271.

Somalis) rather than against him personally.⁹⁶ The U.S.'s technical superiority was of little use when confronting an enemy who understood his target audience. If planners had grasped the clan mentality and the value of radio communication in Somali society earlier, they could have cut off Aideed from his potential supporters.⁹⁷

Unwilling or unable to understand the options open to the warlords' followers, the UN only made the situation worse by escalating its search and destroy tactics. Repeated attempts to capture Aideed throughout September and October of 1993 resulted in horrendous collateral damage in Mogadishu. In one case, a raid by U.S. special operations forces targeted a Habar Gidir clan meeting location, hoping to get Aideed. Instead, the U.S. soldiers killed a number of clan elders alongside women and children. People who held tremendous power in their clan, the elders could have been recruited into the political peace process in time and used to neutralize Aideed's support base.⁹⁸ In this light, the retaliatory massacre of eighteen U.S. service members was only a symbol of the overall failure of the international intervention. Peace enforcement operations in Mogadishu had united the public and the warlords against the international forces, and had given the warlords the support they needed to continue to spoil the political settlement process.

C. PEACE ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS AND THE SOMALI SPOILERS

The dynamics of Operation Restore Hope sabotaged the peace process in Somalia by failing to deter the major spoilers to political settlement, the warlords. Throughout the 1992-1995 UN intervention in Somalia, peace enforcement operations ran askew of political negotiations, but the scale of force offered by UNITAF meant that its presence did the most damage to the peace process. As a U.S.-led coalition, UNITAF enjoyed a credibility and capability to appropriately use force in support of its objectives in Somalia; unfortunately, its limited objectives (food aid) and timeline (a few months) meant that a less credible UN force would have to pick up where it ended in mid-1993.⁹⁹ The indirect support that Operation Restore Hope lent to the warlords would be

⁹⁶ Brune, 29-30.

⁹⁷ Lewis, 269, 331.

⁹⁸ Brune, 31-2.

⁹⁹ Boulden, 135.

compounded by an ineffective transition between U.S.-led and UN-led peace enforcement operations in Somalia – the result being an inability to tackle the spoilers to the peace process.

Since the beginning of the UN operations in Somalia, the interveners had been held hostage to Aideed's goodwill. First, the UNOSOM I military observers were prevented from deploying throughout Mogadishu for two months by Aideed. Then, Aideed hindered the follow-on UN security force of 500 men from deploying in the city because he feared that they supported his rival, Mahdi, against him. Thus, the Pakistani contingent was held up at the Mogadishu airport indefinitely. Aideed's *de facto* control over key sections of the city caused the UN troops' mandate to shift toward force protection/self-defense and away from the various UNSCRs they were there to implement.¹⁰⁰ In order to jump-start their mission, UN forces had to cooperate with Aideed throughout 1992. Even at this point, it was clear to UN policymakers that Aideed was not acting as a good-faith participant in any kind of peace process for Somalia. Aideed's actions represented just the first of many stalling tactics that characterized his role as a spoiler.

Enter Operation Restore Hope, a U.S.-led contingent equipped to bypass impediments like Aideed and conduct peace enforcement operations rather than observation duties. Under its Chapter VII mandate, UNITAF had the right to forcibly disarm factions that got in its way during humanitarian relief operations. Accordingly, UNITAF forbade the use of technicals (truck-mounted machine guns), roadblocks, banditry, and the open display of weaponry within its operating areas. These rules provided an effective deterrent against further violence in these areas because the warlords understood that UNITAF forces were primarily concerned about the safety of the aid convoys. The warlords kept their weaponry outside of visible range, and UNITAF forces left them alone. While UNITAF commanders had the option to forcibly disarm belligerent factions, they felt that it was not necessary to complete their limited objectives. This understanding – both spoken and unspoken – between UNITAF forces and the warlords contributed to largely successful humanitarian relief operations, but also failed to address the threat to political settlement posed by the warlords. As Operation

¹⁰⁰ Boulden, 55-6.

Restore Hope drew to a close, the interveners prepared to transition into UNOSOM II. The U.S.-led coalition came under increasing pressure from the UN to actively disarm the warlords' militias, but UNITAF did not see disarmament as part of its mandate in Somalia. After all, UNITAF was there to provide security for food aid, not to stabilize the security environment in support of a political peace process. In short, Operation Restore Hope ignored the issue of spoilers, and handed over a simmering security environment to UNOSOM II in March 1993.¹⁰¹

At that precise point in time, *de facto* collusion between the warlords and UNITAF forces vaulted the warlords into key positions in the Addis Ababa negotiations: in return for being legitimized as political representatives, the warlords would allow UNITAF to finish its humanitarian relief operations and return home safely. As UNITAF left and UNOSOM II military personnel took over in Mogadishu, Aideed no longer feared military retaliation for his many provocations against the UN-led, voluntary disarmament process attached to the Addis Ababa accords. Lacking incentives to give up his military might and thus weaken his bargaining position vis-à-vis the other warlords, Aideed resisted disarmament. UNITAF, which had been equipped (if unwilling) to handle such a scenario, was gone. UNOSOM II, suffering from command and control problems and a general lack of credibility, was overwhelmed to the point that it made the arrest of Aideed a priority in the disarmament process. Thus, the military expedient of dealing with Aideed's remaining militia became a political objective in and of itself.¹⁰² Because UNITAF had not worked to create a security environment permissive to the political goals of the peace process, UNOSOM II was unable to effectively counter spoilers like Aideed. Finally, the UN was forced to leave Somalia altogether due to a "lack of sufficient cooperation from the Somali parties over security issues" which had "fundamentally undermined the UN objectives" for conflict resolution in Somalia.¹⁰³

Attempts to establish a political process fell apart before a transitional government could get off the ground; state rebuilding was a failed dream of the UN. Military force threatened the livelihoods of the warlords and scared the populace, while

¹⁰¹ Boulden, 64-5.

¹⁰² Ibid., 74-5.

¹⁰³ Boulden, 63.

the political reconciliation process neglected to offer either the warlords or strong elements of civil society incentives to create a stable government. The make-or-break point in the intervention occurred during Operation Restore Hope, when UNITAF forces had the power necessary to tackle the warlord spoilers and stabilize the security situation so that the political peace process could move forward. Without a mandate to do so, or strong ties to the ongoing political negotiations, Operation Restore Hope remains the prime exemplar of how peace enforcement operations can achieve their narrow objectives and at the same time erode the chances for long-term conflict resolution.

III. THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (DRC)

In the last chapter, I showed how Operation Restore Hope had not been able to deter spoilers in Somalia, leading to the failure of the political settlement process and a continuation of the conflict. Without an effective peace enforcement operation there, conflict resolution efforts stalled indefinitely. The DRC, however, provides an example of how effective peace enforcement sparks progress in the political settlement process. In this chapter, I will demonstrate how Operation Artemis used its highly credible threat of force impartially, enforcing the peace and rescuing the political settlement process in the DRC.

A. BACKGROUND TO CONFLICT

1. Civil War

By 1997, the country that would become the Democratic Republic of Congo had been ruled by the wily dictator Mobutu Sese Seko for over thirty years. During that time, Mobutu had capitalized on the divisiveness of the Congolese ethnic groups comprising the country, playing them against each other to prevent any one group from posing a serious threat to his regime. As part of this strategy, he had stoked resentment between “indigenous communities” in the Eastern Congo and the “immigrant” Rwandan people who had been living alongside them for decades. Following the Rwandan genocide in 1994, this ethnic tension was exacerbated by the mass influx of Hutu refugees, threatening the tenuous ethnic balance in the Eastern Congo.¹⁰⁴

Congolese Rwandaphones had lived in the Eastern Congo Ituri and Kivu provinces since the colonial period, during which foreign mining interests had perpetuated divide-and-rule tactics between the Hema and Lendu ethnic groups. The socio-economic change created by international exploitation led to forced migrations and disrupted land ownership and grazing rights between ethnic groups. As in Rwanda, the predominantly pastoralist people (in this case the Hema) became the privileged elite, while the Lendu were relegated to being farm laborers. Mobutu’s policies during the

¹⁰⁴ Séverine Autesserre, “Local Violence, National Peace? Postwar ‘Settlement’ in the Eastern D.R. Congo (2003-2006),” *African Studies Review* 29:3 (December 2006): 3.

post-independence period, which favored the Hema in land reform issues, continued to spark animosity between the groups and sometimes led to localized communal violence. Mobutu had been careful not to let the conflict get out of hand, however, as this would jeopardize his hold over the country as a whole. This situation ensued until the balance was overturned by the regional turmoil resulting from the 1994 Tutsi-Hutu bloodshed in Rwanda, which spilled over into the Eastern DRC.¹⁰⁵

The civil war that erupted out of the East in 1996 demonstrated the interface between national, regional, and local violence in the DRC – the ethnic tensions at the local and regional levels in the East served as catalysts for a national and international war, which in turn fostered cyclic violence back at the local level.¹⁰⁶ Because of these linkages, the stability of the DRC as a whole, and the Ituri region in particular, was dependent on dealing with those responsible for perpetuating violence at all levels.

2. Regional Intervention

In 1996, Laurent Kabila spun together a coalition of elements dissatisfied with Mobutu's harsh rule and quickly took over the country from East to West, proclaiming victory in Kinshasa. His coalition was made up of the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo (AFDL), which was comprised of predominantly Tutsi fighters supported by both Uganda and Rwanda to overthrow Mobutu. The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) government in Rwanda supported Kabila's coup in return for the ability to destroy massive Hutu refugee camps in the Eastern DRC, which were responsible for anti-regime attacks into Rwanda and threatened to destabilize Rwanda's new Tutsi government. Congolese Tutsis in the AFDL joined Kabila's forces in their campaign for Kinshasa, while the RPF made use of local supporters to destroy the refugee camps in 1996.¹⁰⁷ Uganda, a strong ally of the RPF government, also backed the

¹⁰⁵ International Crisis Group, "Congo Crisis: Military Intervention in Ituri," *Africa Report* no. 64 (13 June 2003): 2; "Maintaining Momentum in the Congo: The Ituri Problem," *Africa Report* no. 84 (26 August 2004): 2.

¹⁰⁶ Autesserre, 4.

¹⁰⁷ Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, "Civil War, Peacekeeping, and the Great Lakes Region," in *The Causes of War and the Consequences of Peacekeeping in Africa*, ed. Ricardo René Laremont (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2001), 92-6; Mel McNulty, "The Collapse of Zaire: Implosion, Revolution, or External Sabotage?" *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 37:1 (March 1999): 75.

AFDL and Kabila. When Kabila took Kinshasa in May 1997, the bulk of his fighting forces were Rwandans and Congolese Tutsis from the East.

The alliance of convenience soon soured, however, as Rwanda and Uganda exploited their newfound access to the mineral resources of the Eastern DRC. Rwandan and Ugandan troops in the East co-opted local collaborators and established warlords to facilitate their exploitation of metal and gas deposits there. The AFDL created a \$250 million contract with a Canadian mining company in 1997, giving it rights to cobalt and copper mines and making the coalition partners rich.¹⁰⁸ Kabila started to regret the free reign he had given to his erstwhile partners and his dependence on their fighters. Rwanda claimed that Kabila was not cooperating fully with its campaign to root out Hutu insurgents in the border region, and in turn used this as a pretext to occupy the Eastern DRC and secure its economic interests in the 1996-98 time period. Kabila, fearing that his Tutsi army officers would assassinate him on Rwanda's orders, attempted to purge all Congolese and Rwandan Tutsis from his military forces in 1998.¹⁰⁹ He ordered the massacre of all Tutsi military recruits; shortly thereafter, the Second Congo War commenced. Between 1998 and 1999, Rwanda and elements of the former Congolese Armed Forces (FAC) from Mobutu's era waged war on Kabila's regime and sparked renewed civil war across the DRC.¹¹⁰

The ethnic dimension to the war continued to reflect the struggle for control over local, regional, national, and international politics. Warlords throughout the East claimed to represent ethnic constituencies, but instead made alliances with various Congolese, Rwandan, and Ugandan factions based on their ability to provide economic or political riches. The "authentic" or traditional tribal leaders attempted to keep their people out of the fighting in order to avoid further cycles of retribution and unchecked violence from their neighbors.¹¹¹ The warlords, in contrast, had nothing to lose and everything to gain in the escalating fighting in the East – without militias to back them up, these men would

¹⁰⁸ Nzongola-Ntalaja, 98-101.

¹⁰⁹ International Crisis Group, "Pulling Back from the Brink in the Congo," *Africa Briefing* (1 July 2004): 7.

¹¹⁰ Nzongola-Ntalaja, 92.

¹¹¹ Nzongola-Ntalaja, 96.

lose their newfound positions of prestige and wealth. These local struggles were exacerbated by the intervention of Kabila's, Rwanda's, and Uganda's forces in the East. Kabila's fate as the DRC's leader was jeopardized by the instability in the East, and the East was destabilized by intervention from Kinshasa and neighboring country forces.

As the Second Congo War heated up in August 1998, Uganda and Rwanda were drifting apart in the East. While in a position to halt the fighting and end the war, they instead manipulated the local security environment to their advantage. Both Rwanda and Uganda had economic incentives motivating them to manage, but not stop, the fighting. The Second Congo War was characterized by battles over turf and resources rather than political ideology.¹¹² The Uganda People's Defense Force (UPDF) occupied the Ituri province in August 1998, initially in support of Rwanda's invasion of the DRC, ostensibly to ensure security. However, by 1999 the various proxies being propped up by Rwanda and Uganda split apart and their leaders worked to mobilize their own ethnic support bases. In effect, the proxies further polarized the Hema and Lendu groups throughout Ituri and made them dependent on the warlords for survival.¹¹³

The Ugandan-backed RCD-ML (*Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie – Mouvement de Libération*) faction established its headquarters in the provincial capital of Ituri, Bunia, and incited Hema attacks against Lendus there. Lendu fighters retaliated with massacres in Bunia. By 2001, full-scale ethnic cleansing campaigns rolled across Ituri as factions took over new territories and/or lost ground as alliances shifted. Uganda backed a succession of proxies as it pillaged Ituri's natural resources, relying on Hema acquiescence in return for greater land ownership at the expense of the Lendu.¹¹⁴ By August 2002, a new Ugandan-backed warlord, Thomas Lubanga, controlled Bunia. As Lubanga's Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC) began to purge Lendus in Bunia, the movement lost the support of the Hema traditional authorities, as purges sparked retaliation against Hemas in rural areas of Ituri controlled by other factions. Again, pre-civil war leaders recognized the warlords and their proxy militias as impediments to the

¹¹² Nzongola-Ntalaja, 100-5.

¹¹³ Johan Pottier, "Roadblock Ethnology: Negotiating Humanitarian Access in Ituri, Eastern DR Congo, 1999-2004," *Africa* 76:2: 157.

¹¹⁴ International Crisis Group, "Congo Crisis," 3.

peace process underway for Ituri and the DRC, but were powerless against the militias. Further splintering of factions led to Lubanga's UPC switching allegiance to Rwanda, and a new Ugandan proxy coalition retaking Bunia in March 2003. At that time, Lendu fighters cleansed the Hema residents and destroyed non-governmental organization (NGO) offices because of their perceived bias toward the Hema.¹¹⁵ The cycle of massacres and exploitation of the local communities seemed irreversible so long as Ugandan and Rwandan support remained a driving factor for warlordism.

3. The Political Settlement Process Stalls

Since the end of the Second Congo War in 1999, the peace process for the DRC has been drawn-out and fraught with setbacks. The war officially came to an end with the Lusaka ceasefire of 1999, which required all the countries that had intervened in the civil war in the DRC to withdraw their troops and stop supporting proxy rebel militias. Lusaka provided the mandate for the UN to form MONUC, which would be responsible for the disarmament and demobilization of all rebel militants. Uganda and Rwanda, however, delayed implementing Lusaka due to their concerns over instability in Ituri and the Kivus, which threatened their own national security. Finally, in 2002, the two countries agreed to cease supporting insurgencies in the East. That year, Uganda pledged in the Luanda Agreement to withdraw its forces and support for the UPC and other militias in Ituri.¹¹⁶

One of Uganda's conditions for withdrawing its forces from Ituri was that a mechanism would be constructed to deal with the lack of security along Uganda's border with the DRC. Recognizing that the interference of neighboring states was crippling the overall peace process in the DRC (and specifically Uganda's actions in Ituri), the Luanda Agreement created a bilateral security mechanism in which the Kinshasa and Kampala governments would pacify the East. Most of the major factions active in Ituri agreed to create a secure environment in which Ituri could be administratively reunified and foreign soldiers would be forced to return to Uganda. Thus, the Luanda Agreement also provided for the establishment of the Ituri Pacification Commission (IPC) – representatives from

¹¹⁵ Pottier, 159; International Crisis Group, "Congo Crisis," 5.

¹¹⁶ Institute for Security Studies, *The Peace Process in the DRC: A Reader* (Pretoria: ISS, 2004) 5-9, 17.

various ethnic groups and civil society throughout Ituri would come together to administer the province until the federal government became operational and could effectively govern Ituri. In effect, the UN left the task of creating security in Ituri to the warlords and deposed administrators who had not been able to stand up to them throughout the Second Congo War. Only those militias with strong bargaining positions – meaning current control over territories and resources – were included in the Luanda Agreement negotiations in 2002.¹¹⁷

Meanwhile, the Inter-Congolese Dialogue attempted to settle the political future of the DRC amongst the various rebel leaders and Kabila. In December 2002, the major warlords from across the DRC and Kabila agreed to a two-year transitional government. In Sun City, in April of 2003, the Inter-Congolese Dialogue concluded with the establishment of a political structure for the transitional government. Kabila would be president and the leaders of the four main rebel factions would be vice presidents until national elections were to take place in 2005.¹¹⁸

In April 2003, the IPC conjoined in Bunia and formed the Ituri Interim Administration (IIA), the political leadership of the province who would implement the beginning stages of reconstruction. Significantly, the IIA relied upon the UN to ensure the safety of civilians and administrators until reliable DRC police and military forces could be formed.¹¹⁹ Bunia was experiencing a brief lull in the fighting due to the presence of 7,000 Ugandan troops. The UPC had been driven out of Bunia by the Ugandan forces in early March, and a ceasefire was in effect. The IPC took advantage of the relative calm to form the IIA, and Uganda agreed to a timetable for withdrawing from Ituri and handing the security situation over to the IIA and its UN supporters. But,

Ugandan redeployment in early May led to renewed violence as the UN proved unable to fill the security vacuum.

Thomas Lubanga and the UPC became the primary spoiler to the IPC, since he had not been part of the previous peace negotiations that created it and his militia stood to lose control over Bunia and Ituri if the peace process went forward. The violence in Ituri

¹¹⁷ Pottier, 159; International Crisis Group, “Congo Crisis,” 7.

¹¹⁸ Institute for Security Studies, 19-23.

¹¹⁹ International Crisis Group, “Maintaining Momentum in the Congo,” 12.

had been too chaotic and the allegiances too complicated for the Inter-Congolese Dialogue to include all of its rebel leaders in the negotiations for the peace process.¹²⁰ Because of the constant shifting and splitting of militia factions in the East, agreements reached during the Inter-Congolese Dialogue negotiations inevitably excluded latecomer players like Lubanga, and those warlords seated at the table refused to renegotiate for a smaller share of the pie with newcomers. Kabila's government, Uganda, and their respective proxies in Ituri came to an understanding in December 2002, allowing each to retain influence and control within Ituri to the exclusion of Lubanga. The UPC's demands went unrecognized into the spring of 2003.¹²¹

In March 2003, Uganda's proxy routed the UPC from Bunia and brokered a ceasefire between the remaining militias, allowing the IPC to meet in early April. Under UN guidance, the IIA established itself to reconstruct and rehabilitate the province with the help of community members, militia leaders, and government spokesmen. The IPC mandated one department of the IIA to oversee the stabilization of the security environment, but relied on UN promises to deploy a multinational force in Ituri capable of enforcing the March ceasefire as the UPDF redeployed to Uganda.¹²²

4. The United Nations Organization Mission in the DRC (MONUC)

MONUC had been established in 1999 to monitor the implementation of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. Continued fighting between the remnants of various national armies, militias, and rebel forces meant that civilians needed protection while the security environment was dealt with in the ongoing peace process. Recognizing that simply observing atrocities being committed against the local populace was not enough, the UN empowered MONUC with a Chapter VII mandate in 2000, which stipulated that UN forces "protect the civilians under imminent threat of physical violence."¹²³ The UN was not able to garner the political will from the member states to back up this mandate, and MONUC suffered from a decided lack of troop contributions. By 2001, MONUC

¹²⁰ BBC, "Congo Warlord Flown to the Hague," *BBC*, October 18, 2007, online edition, <http://news.bbc.co.uk>.

¹²¹ International Crisis Group, "Congo Crisis," 8.

¹²² *Ibid.*, 10-1.

¹²³ Katarina Månsson, "Use of Force and Civilian Protection: Peace Operations in the Congo," *International Peacekeeping* 12:4 (Winter 2005): 505.

had fielded just 200 of the 5,537 troops originally called for in the 2000 mandate – the UN was forced to downgrade the mandate to ceasefire monitoring.¹²⁴

Throughout 2001, the spiraling humanitarian catastrophe in the East embroiled MONUC in fierce debate over the protection of civilian life. In June 2002, the UN responded by reinstating the protection mandate in UNSCR 1417, which called for MONUC to be reinforced in order to conduct peace enforcement operations. The UN allocated 8,700 troops to peace operations in the DRC, which would include the deployment of the 712 Uruguayans to Bunia and others for security sector work in Ituri. This, too, turned out to be too little too late: a MONUC special investigation team traveled to Ituri in February 2003 to look into reports of the Lendu-Hema ethnic cleansing campaigns, and identified that the current MONUC forces could not afford adequate protection to the populace.¹²⁵

When Ugandan soldiers redeployed home from Bunia in late April 2003, as dictated by the IPC process, Lubanga's forces returned and 400 civilians were slaughtered as his militia retook most of the city. Bunia split into two armed camps, with Lendu militias controlling the South and Hema militias controlling the North. UN troops supposedly mandated to guard the city and protect civilian lives fell back to UN facilities, as they were too undermanned and outgunned to do otherwise.¹²⁶ MONUC, with only 712 Uruguayan military guards in Bunia when the 7,000 Ugandans left, was in no position to enforce the March ceasefire or prevent the re-emergence of spoiler groups like the UPC. Likewise, the federal police force deployed from Kinshasa proved incompetent, turning its weapons over to the militias and deserting due to lack of pay. In early May, ethnic cleansing accelerated and MONUC forces proved insufficient to defend NGO offices, let alone guarantee the safety of the civilians in Bunia. Throughout early May, various militias hunted down opposition community leaders and aid workers while MONUC hid in its compound. A new round of negotiations took place to include the UPC, which had *de facto* control over half of Bunia. The militias agreed to share the city

¹²⁴ Katarina Månsson, "Use of Force and Civilian Protection: Peace Operations in the Congo," *International Peacekeeping* 12:4 (Winter 2005), 503-7.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, 507-10.

¹²⁶ Pottier, 159.

and accept deployment of a new international peacekeeping force, but before MONUC could be reinforced, the UPC reneged and conquered the entire city.¹²⁷

As MONUC, international aid workers, local officials, and civilians came under attack in Ituri, the UN recognized that the imminent failure of the IIA would drag the national peace process down with it. In late May, belatedly, the Secretary General called for “the establishment of the framework of security in support of the Ituri Pacification Commission process, which remained the ‘real chance of comprehensive peace and reconciliation in the area.’”¹²⁸ At this time, MONUC could muster only 4,700 troops in the entire country.¹²⁹ Ituri required its own peace enforcement brigade under MONUC rather than a few hundred guards who were, in effect, operating under a Chapter VI mandate. The Uruguayan troops deployed to Bunia under MONUC were only mandated to guard UN and IPC facilities and personnel, not to protect civilian lives. MONUC’s presence, however, had the unintended consequence of raising hopes amongst the civilian populace that they would be protected by MONUC.¹³⁰ While the IIA administrators may have been protected in their compound, guarded by the Uruguayans, they clearly could not fulfill their rebuilding and reconciliation mission from within their walls, especially while the target population was being slaughtered by spoilers like Lubanga.

As far as Lubanga was concerned, his inclusion in the peace negotiations was too little too late. Without a credible force to deter him, he was able to use force to control Ituri’s resources and continue to destabilize the wider peace process in the DRC. While the removal of direct external support for violence in Ituri had been accomplished, ethnic conflict remained a viable strategy for the warlords to perpetuate their aspirations for political and economic power.¹³¹ The entire peace process for the DRC was in jeopardy due to MONUC’s inability to ensure security in the East, and vice versa.

¹²⁷ International Crisis Group, “Congo Crisis,” 11-13; Ståle Ulriksen, Catriona Gourlay, and Catriona Mace, “Operation Artemis: The Shape of Things to Come,” *International Peacekeeping* 11:3 (Autumn 2004): 510-11.

¹²⁸ Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, *Operation Artemis: The Lessons of the Interim Emergency Multinational Force* (New York: United Nations, 2004), 15.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, 6.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, 7-8.

¹³¹ International Crisis Group, “Maintaining Momentum,” 8.

B. EU INTERVENTION

In the spring of 2003, the international community recognized that the massacres occurring in Ituri had to be contained if the peace process in the DRC were to go forward. While the UN had not been effective in soliciting member state troop contributions for MONUC, countries were willing to offer up forces for a coalition peace operation over which they could exercise greater control. For this very reason, talks between key member states, the UN, and the European Union (EU) coalesced into Operation Artemis in May 2003. Over the course of the summer, Artemis proved itself able to deter spoilers by bringing the military capacity that MONUC lacked to Bunia. Artemis's logistical superiority, special operations forces, and air support made it a credible peace enforcement mission in the eyes of the spoilers to the peace process.

1. French Instigation for Intervention

Since Belgium had granted Zaire and other central African countries independence in the early 1960s, France had considered itself guardian of their interests. Having supported the dictator Mobutu throughout the Cold War, France was eager to rectify the situation that had developed after Mobutu's overthrow and regain its influence in the DRC. In order to deflect accusations of neocolonialism, France was looking to intervene in the DRC with the blessing of a UN mandate. France also recognized that the militia leaders in Ituri and their Ugandan and Rwandan supporters would not view a unilateral intervention as impartial,¹³² given France's history of king-making in the area.

Thus, France began planning for intervention in early May 2003, while negotiations with the EU and UN proceeded. As the EU's Political and Security Committee worked up a proposal to deploy a European force to augment the UN in Ituri, France prepared to lead it as the "framework nation" behind the operation.¹³³ Due to its experience of interventions on the continent, and its continued presence in the form of pre-positioned troops and equipment there, France offered a very practical rationale for leading the notional EU force. But the introduction of a European force into the area threatened to provoke accusations of partiality due to the perception of neocolonialism,

¹³² Ulriksen et al, 511.

¹³³ Ibid., 511-3.

particularly on the part of France in Central Africa. The multinational composition of Artemis helped to disabuse those perceptions, however, as the mission contained troops from eight different countries, some without any national agenda in Africa.¹³⁴ France had the forces and the political will to intervene in the DRC, and by working through an EU coalition of the willing (to be mandated by the UN), it would gain the international legitimacy it needed to successfully launch the operation in Ituri.

2. EU Intervention and the UN Mandate

In late May 2003, the UN Secretary General recognized that the deteriorating security situation in Ituri demanded a brigade-sized force dedicated to Bunia. Desperately needing First World resources to buttress MONUC, but unable to obtain and field them in time to avert genocide in Ituri, the UN settled for an EU-led deployment. On 30 May, UNSCR 1484 authorized the Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF) for the DRC, nicknamed Operation Artemis. It was mandated with Chapter VII powers to

contribute to the stabilization of the security conditions and the improvement of the humanitarian situation in Bunia, to ensure the protection of the airport, the IDPs in the camps in Bunia and, if the situation requires it, to contribute to the safety of the civilian population, UN personnel and the humanitarian presence.¹³⁵

The IEMF's responsibilities included protecting the 20,000 IDPs in Bunia, the airport that MONUC and the NGOs relied upon, as well as international peacekeepers themselves. All the signatories to the Luanda Agreement and all participants in the IPC would have to cooperate fully with Artemis forces.¹³⁶

The situation that had developed in Bunia and greater Ituri demanded an effective peace enforcement presence to support the IIA's mission and the greater political process in Kinshasa. Unable to expedite an effective force, the UN settled for the IEMF for the summer of 2003. When IEMF forces would withdraw in September, MONUC forces

¹³⁴ Ulriksen et al, 520.

¹³⁵ S/RES/1484, para. 1, quoted in Månsson, 510.

¹³⁶ Ulriksen et al., 513-4.

would have to be augmented into a brigade-sized force – the UN realized that armed factions hostile to the peace process would test MONUC in Ituri once Artemis left.¹³⁷

3. Enforcing Peace

Operation Artemis was authorized for only three months' duration, expiring on 1 September 2003. It was a short-term surge of forces designed to stabilize the security environment and then transfer a stabilized Bunia back over to MONUC so that the UN-sponsored peace process for the DRC could continue. On 12 June, Artemis forces deployed from Europe to Bunia, through a forward operating base at Entebbe, Uganda. French military aircraft in Chad, Gabon, and Uganda provided reserve tanking, close air support, and reconnaissance capabilities to the operation. Strategic airlift, however, was beyond even the EU's organic capabilities and had to be brokered from third party countries – the EU, unlike the UN, could call upon outside airlift assets quickly.¹³⁸

Starting out, Artemis benefited from logistical superiority, with a full complement of European combat engineers to maintain airfields at both Bunia and Entebbe, Uganda. Bilateral ties between European states and Uganda brokered the use of Entebbe as a forward operating base for the duration of Operation Artemis. Entebbe was vital to the deployment and sustainment of Artemis troops in Ituri: all personnel, supplies, and equipment from the EU were funneled through Entebbe. Alone, Bunia airport could not handle the size of aircraft needed to bring the sheer volume of cargo necessary for combat troops in Ituri. Strategic airlift resourced by the EU, both organic and contracted, carried Artemis resources to Entebbe, where it was transshipped via tactical airlift to Bunia. The fact that the EU could provide such airlift, and maintain a busy operating tempo in Entebbe, enabled it to project force into Bunia in a way that the resource-strapped UN could not.¹³⁹

As the advance forces for Artemis began deploying into Bunia from 6-12 June, local militias tested their commitment and strength. Lubanga redeployed 15,000 of the

¹³⁷ DPKO, 15.

¹³⁸ Ulriksen et al., 515-7.

¹³⁹ DPKO, 12; Fernanda Faria, *Crisis Management in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Role of the European Union* (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2004), 43; Ulriksen et al., 515-6.

UPC's militants to the outskirts of the city in preparation for Artemis's arrival, but left 700 soldiers in the city to protect his position. Clashes between factions gradually diminished as more EU peacekeepers arrived and started patrolling Bunia in earnest. Initial impressions that the French troops were battling the Lendu militants alone – effectively taking sides – were disproved when Artemis forces defended civilians in Bunia from both Lendu and Hema militants. Once the main force was on the ground in Bunia, the operation's commander, Gen. Thonier, retracted his earlier statement that “separating the factions is not part of my mission,” and demanded the disarmament or dispersal of all militants from Bunia.¹⁴⁰

On 22 June, Thonier announced the creation of a no-weapons zone within 10 kilometers of Bunia. Lubanga tested Artemis's resolve, leaving his troops camped within Bunia's suburbs and inside this zone. Artemis, unlike MONUC forces in Ituri, had the combat-ready forces necessary to enforce the separation of the militias and civilians. In early July, Artemis forces raided one of Lubanga's non-compliant camps just outside Bunia, at Miala. While the EU force searched the camp for outlawed arms, a group of rebels threatened the Artemis troops with a rocket-propelled grenade, forcing the EU troops to open fire and kill three militants. Over the course of its deployment, Artemis continued to seek out and confiscate weapons on several occasions, provoking firefights that killed 20 militants.¹⁴¹ While smaller factions had been suspicious of Artemis, fearing that it would be partial to the UPC forces in Bunia due to their entrenched position there,¹⁴² Artemis demonstrated its intent to root out all militants from Bunia when it overturned camps like Miala.

When Artemis cleared all rebel stockpiles from the Bunia zone, it displayed impartiality as well as credibility – both Hema and Lendu militants would be fired upon if they provoked Artemis forces by carrying weapons into Bunia or threatening civilians.¹⁴³ While different factions remained present in different areas of the city and suburbs, they could not launch an offensive against each other or Artemis. EU forces

¹⁴⁰ Ulriksen et al., 517-9.

¹⁴¹ Ulriksen et al., 519.

¹⁴² International Crisis Group, “Congo Crisis,” 14.

¹⁴³ DPKO, 12-3.

introduced common rules-of-engagement between the militias and Artemis – militants could not enter the city armed. If Artemis learned of rebel arms, it sent out a task force to remove them from the militants’ control. Artemis acted as “impartial and proactive” enforcers of the peace in Bunia.¹⁴⁴

A large part of Artemis’s credibility stems from its use of Special Forces in situations like Miala. In order to search out and confiscate rebel weaponry, the peace enforcement mission had to be capable of engaging in combat with militants unwilling to lose their caches. When attacked by guerilla forces, Artemis had to be able to respond with overwhelming force, but without endangering nearby civilians. The battle at Miala, within the no-weapons zone around Bunia, stands as an example of the effectiveness of Special Forces in this regard. Of its 1,100 troops in Bunia, Artemis boasted around 320 Special Forces soldiers that could be sent out on such missions while the regular forces guarded Bunia and the local populace. The UN recognized that the use of Special Forces “gave the IEMF a highly effective capability to engage and neutralize armed threats even beyond the area of operations.”¹⁴⁵

Artemis’s credibility as enforcer of the peace was also enhanced by its use of close air support. Again, historical ties between France and neighboring African states afforded Artemis the use of military airbases within range of Bunia. French fighter aircraft pre-positioned in Chad and Uganda buzzed over Artemis forces in the initial stages of deployment to signal Artemis’s firepower to actors who may have been contemplating provoking EU forces. French support aircraft in Chad, Gabon, and Uganda provided refueling and aerial reconnaissance capabilities to Artemis throughout its deployment. French combat support aircraft lent an intimidation factor to the Artemis deployment that UN troop transports could not provide for MONUC forces. While the 1,100 EU troops could have been overwhelmed by a concerted attack of the more numerous militants, the projection of airpower on behalf of Artemis ground forces exponentially increased Artemis’s credibility as a deterrent to hostile militias.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴⁴ Ulriksen et al., 519.

¹⁴⁵ DPKO, 13.

¹⁴⁶ DPKO, 13; Ulriksen et al., 517; Faria, 43.

Altogether, the EU's access and willingness to employ its logistics, Special Forces, intelligence, and close air support capabilities proved to be fundamental to Artemis's success.¹⁴⁷ None of these capabilities was offered to MONUC by the UN member states, because the states preferred to retain them under what they considered more reliable command and control – namely, a more cohesive organization like the EU. Each contributed to Artemis's credibility to deter hostile militants by reinforcing its combat strength. They enabled the EU to project “the threat or the use of force in a convincing manner” and to rapidly “establish its presence and stabilize the area of its deployment.”¹⁴⁸ Installing a credible peace enforcement operation in Ituri allowed the immediate humanitarian crisis¹⁴⁹ to be dealt with rather than further exploited by rebel leaders like Lubanga.

4. Paving the Way for Political Settlement

By September, Bunia was largely pacified and civilian lives had been protected inside the disarmed zone. However, as EU forces prepared to hand their mandate over to MONUC, it became apparent that the relative calm in Bunia had been won at the expense of greater Ituri. Militants and weapons had been forced out of Bunia, but the rebel groups had not been demobilized or reintegrated into regular society. Instead, they continued to operate with impunity in the countryside, in which Artemis did not have jurisdiction or the operational capacity to police. Lubanga's militia regrouped and went on to battle for control over nearby territories and resources.¹⁵⁰

The UN authorized a MONUC brigade specifically to deal with the Ituri region as a whole, recognizing that insecurity in the East threatened to destabilize the peace process just as much as insecurity in the West did, despite the East's isolation from Kinshasa. But, where Artemis has succeeded in providing security for Bunia, MONUC forces lacked the capacity to enforce peace similarly throughout Ituri. When Artemis redeployed, the equipment and logistical capacity that it had brought with it went home,

¹⁴⁷ DPKO, 14.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., 12.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., 16.

¹⁵⁰ DPKO, 14; Månsson, 511; Ulriksen et al., 520.

as well. The peremptory changeover from Artemis forces to MONUC left MONUC without the military superiority and its associated credibility to deter rebel forces from attempting to spoil the IPC.¹⁵¹ While Operation Artemis had been key to tackling spoilers in Ituri, further follow-through on the part of the UN would be vital to the overall success of the peace process in the DRC.

In order to build on Artemis's success in Bunia, the UN Security Council authorized an increase in MONUC forces to 10,800, with a brigade-sized force to continue security operations in Ituri.¹⁵² But one year after Artemis's withdrawal from Ituri, MONUC troop levels on the ground had reached only half of the authorized number at approximately 5,900. The UN Security Council recognized that it needed to step up efforts in the East to "promote the re-establishment of confidence, to discourage violence, in particular by deterring the use of force to threaten the political process."¹⁵³

This language spoke to the heart of the security problem in Ituri: unless spoilers to the peace process could be tackled effectively, the peace process would never become more than mission statements. The precedent set by Operation Artemis, which had used its credible threat of force and impartial implementation of security measures to deter spoilers in Bunia, encouraged MONUC to fortify its forces in Ituri and ensure the momentum of the political settlement process in the DRC.

C. LESSONS LEARNED: OPERATION ARTEMIS AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION

In order to prevent rebel factions from spoiling the local and national peace processes, Artemis had to operate a highly effective peace enforcement mission in Bunia. MONUC had displayed its inability to provide enforcement when enforcement was clearly needed, as the actors in Bunia disregarded international efforts that could not stand up to rebel forces.

To be effective, a peace enforcement mission must first be viewed as a credible deterrent to the combatants. The 700 federal police officers and the Uruguayan battalion

¹⁵¹ Månsson, 511-4.

¹⁵² DPKO, 15.

¹⁵³ Månsson, 513-4.

had not been a credible deterrent, as evidenced by the police's desertion and MONUC's withdrawal to its own compounds, both of which left the civilian populace at the militants' mercies. Artemis, in contrast, had the full resources of the EU at its disposal, which offered several advantages that UN forces lacked.

By clearing a zone around Bunia, their area of operations, Artemis's Special Forces prevented rebel factions from using the suburbs as a launching point for attacks against Bunia, the international presence there, and the local populace. The UN, on the other hand, cannot muster Special Forces (to command and control) under its blue flag. Countries that contribute to UN operations like MONUC simply are not willing to give up such valuable, and limited, resources to foreign control. They fear that their Special Forces would be (at best) squandered on UN operations, and (at worst) misused by inept multinational commanders and thus put in unnecessary jeopardy. With its long history of Chapter VI peacekeeping missions, the UN is not structured to make proper use of Special Forces. Due to their history of military interoperability under NATO and the growing political ties within the EU, European military and political leaders were much more willing to use Special Forces for peace enforcement when commanded by a EU-hatted general. The Special Forces (contingent of Artemis) proved to be a key resource for the pacification of Bunia, and one that MONUC could simply not provide in Ituri.

Artemis was also more effective than MONUC in deterring spoilers in the DRC due to its logistical superiority and air support. The resources of the EU enabled the quick deployment and reliable sustainment of Artemis forces. The EU's finances allowed it to contract strategic airlift, bringing Artemis troops into Bunia within days and weeks, rather than the months projected by the UN. Strong bilateral relationship between France and a number of African countries proved invaluable to securing forward basing for tactical airlift and close air support. Simply knowing that EU forces could be so easily reinforced by ground forces and fighter jets acted as a deterrent to rebels seeking to reignite the conflict. With its credible threat and use of force, when and where necessary, Artemis effectively deterred Lubanga and other rebel factions from derailing the political settlement process.

But the credibility to use force as a deterrent is not sufficient to prevent spoilers from sabotaging a peace process. Actors who stand to lose out due to a lack of incentives in the negotiations will be even more zealous about retaining their territories, especially when they fear that their competitors might gain at their expense. Thus, the impartiality of a peace enforcement mission is as crucial to its success as its credibility. From the onset, Artemis refused to support one side against the other. Artemis was very careful to maintain impartiality during the course of its deployment, since any apparent preference for one group or another would pit the others against the peace process. While MONUC had deployed as an impartial presence in Ituri, its lack of credible force had made it vulnerable to armed factions and reliant on faction leaders for survival. Artemis's impartiality, coupled with its credible use of force, enabled it to succeed where MONUC had failed in deterring spoilers like Lubanga.

The credibility and impartiality of Artemis directly contributed to its success in enforcing peace in Bunia. Artemis's capability and willingness to engage militants within the zone saved thousands of lives in Bunia. While the protection of civilian lives might be considered an end in and of itself, doing only that would not equate success for Artemis's mission, nor contribute to the long-term success of the peace process. The effectiveness of Artemis forces ensured that the "political process in Ituri was allowed to resume some activity as political offices reopened in Bunia and the town population began to return ... economic and social activities were resumed."¹⁵⁴ MONUC could return with an Ituri brigade to enable implementation of the national peace process in Ituri, and the IIA could begin to create political order and reconstruction in the province. Artemis both supported the national peace process by preventing a resumption of wide-scale warfare in the East, and at the same time integrated Ituri into the peace process by supporting the establishment of the IIA while the transitional government got off the ground.¹⁵⁵ In Ituri, Artemis deterred the spoilers to the peace process, enabling it to go forward in the DRC.

Artemis contributed to the wider conflict resolution process in the DRC by allowing the IIA to get off the ground, facilitating fledgling political incorporation of Ituri

¹⁵⁴ DPKO, 13.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., 16.

into the DRC peace process. Since the Inter-Congolese Dialogue had come to agreement on establishing a national transitional government, MONUC focused on facilitating the pacification of Ituri, which was a prerequisite for its inclusion in the national dialogue. According to the UN, “supporting the IPC and the establishment of an Interim Authority in Ituri became the central pillars of MONUC’s political strategy for Ituri.”¹⁵⁶ Without the deployment of Artemis in the summer of 2003, the IIA would have been annihilated and Ituri would have remained excluded from the wider peace process.

The very fact that Ituri was seen to be dealt with by Artemis also allowed the transitional government to come into being in June 2003. Warlords like Lubanga had significant disincentives to allow the peace process to go forward and to relinquish power in Ituri, since they would not benefit from peace. While dozens of ministerial positions were being awarded to various factions as part of the transitional government, Lubanga had only what he could hang onto by force of arms in Ituri. Lubanga, and other spoilers, jeopardized attempts to operate a parallel peace process in Ituri in the form of the IPC. By undercutting the spoilers’ efforts in Ituri, Artemis gave the transitional government the breathing room it needed to convene, while at the same time preventing Uganda from re-engaging in Ituri due to the worsening security environment on its border.

Artemis also enabled the later deployment of MONUC’s Ituri brigade, which would tackle the more long-term issues of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of rebel fighters into civilian society, as well as the economic and social reconstruction necessary to ensure a sustainable peace. Artemis provided a crucial stopgap against the absolute lack of law and order in Ituri, which had the potential to spread westward toward the incipient peace process in Kinshasa, just as the First and Second Congo Wars had done. By providing security for humanitarian relief operations in Bunia, Artemis cooled down the conflict in Ituri and created an environment in which the local, and thus national, peace process could proceed. If Artemis had not established a foothold in Ituri and normalized the security situation in Bunia, the follow-on MONUC Ituri brigade would not have been able to continue with the longer-term post-conflict reconstruction and peace building. Artemis’s ability to deter spoilers in Bunia ensured the success of the entire political settlement process in the DRC.

¹⁵⁶ DPKO, 5-6.

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IV. CONCLUSION

A. DETERRING SPOILERS

In the last two chapters, I examined case studies that demonstrated how peace enforcement operations can either succeed (DRC) or fail (Somalia) in deterring spoilers to a peace process, which in turn constitutes either backsliding or progress in the political settlement of the conflict. In this chapter, I will analyze these peace enforcement operations under Stephan Stedman's framework for dealing with spoilers, showing how the strategies used in each case determined the success or failure of the operation in ensuring progress in a political settlement to the conflict.

1. Spoiler Theory

The backbone of spoiler theory lies in how participants in a peace process can prevent rogue actors from "spoiling" the chances for peace through their continued fighting. According to Stephan Stedman, an international force that has assigned itself the responsibility of resolving a conflict must realize "coherent, effective strategies for protecting peace and managing spoilers."¹⁵⁷ How they do so depends greatly on the characteristics of the spoilers they are confronted with, as well what capabilities the interveners can bring to the negotiating process to engage the spoilers accordingly.

While the "spoilers" can be painted broadly as any actor "seeking to undermine peace processes or prevent implementation of peace accords,"¹⁵⁸ individual spoilers must be drawn in fine detail to discover what their motivations are before an appropriate management strategy can be developed. In other words, before one can deter a spoiler, one must first understand what drives him to oppose the peace process. In the following pages, I will examine the types of spoilers encountered in Somalia and the DRC, and then identify the strategies the respective peace enforcement operations used to deal with them.

¹⁵⁷ Stephan John Stedman, "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes," *International Security* 22:2 (Autumn, 1997), 6.

¹⁵⁸ Ken Menkhaus, "Governance without Government in Somalia: Spoilers, State Building, and the Politics of Coping," *International Security* 31:3 (Winter 2006/2007), 75.

2. The Somali and Congolese Spoilers

In Stedman's framework, knowing the four factors that characterize a particular spoiler situation assists interveners in determining the strategy best suited to deterring them. The first factor is the position of the actor in regard to the peace process – is the individual or group currently included or excluded from negotiations for a political settlement? Secondly, how many spoilers are there in the conflict resolution process? Next, what type of goals does the spoiler have in regards to the peace process – does he insist on a small bundle of specific rewards or allocations (“limited”), do his goals change based on changes in his strength vis-à-vis other actors (“greedy”), or does he have grandiose goals that he will stop at nothing to achieve (“total”)?: Finally, wherein does the locus of the spoiler problem lie – is it the leader of a rebel group who spurs his followers on to renew conflict, or is it a case of disenfranchised rebels ignoring orders to lay down arms?¹⁵⁹ Not all of these characteristics are equally relevant in any given spoiler situation, but at least one of them will provide the key to effectively identifying the nature of the spoiler problem, which in turn will enable interveners to determine an appropriate strategy for deterring the spoiler(s).

In both Somalia and the DRC, the spoilers can be best typified as “greedy.” These are actors who seek to maximize their benefits throughout the conflict and even conflict resolution process, whose ambitions inflate or deflate depending on their strength relative to the other actors. They may start out with a limited number of demands, but these demands will grow as their perceived ability to win them through fighting increases. Even when expecting relatively limited demands from peace negotiations, greedy spoilers demonstrate a high commitment to achieve those demands – they can, and will, return to open conflict because they are willing to risk their forces to achieve their goals. The size of their goals depends only on their capacity to achieve them at any given moment in time; they constantly conduct a cost/risk calculus to determine whether to comply with a political settlement or to renew fighting.¹⁶⁰ Greedy spoilers use the threat of force to demand inclusion in political negotiations if they have been previously

¹⁵⁹ Stedman, 8.

¹⁶⁰ Stedman, 11-18.

excluded; if already included in the peace process, they will attempt to undermine implementation of any settlement in order to renegotiate better terms for themselves.¹⁶¹

In Somalia, the political environment during Operation Restore Hope did not favor a comprehensive peace process. No provisional settlement existed in Somalia, and the United Nations was attempting to force Aideed and the other warlords to the negotiating table by bringing in a massive peace enforcement mission that threatened their grip on power.¹⁶² The Addis Ababa accords were on the horizon, but nothing had been settled. In this situation, Aideed knew that he would be included in any political negotiations due to his superior forces in Mogadishu. What he did not know was whether his piece of the pie would be proportionate to his *de facto* superiority in 1992. Thus, he attempted to manipulate the outcome of political negotiations by retaining – and even expanding – his sphere of influence in Mogadishu as negotiations proceeded. Aideed's stalling tactics epitomized the greedy spoiler as he instigated horrific bloodshed in the city in an effort to prevent peace enforcement operations from reducing his power base.

In addition to seeking to expand his power base in the classic “greedy spoiler” sense, Aideed can arguably also be deemed a “legitimate spoiler.” In Somalia, the strong central state under Siad Barre had been responsible for the brutal repression of people outside of his own ethnic group. He had used the state as a tyrannical weapon, and Aideed, among many others, had lost out on opportunities for political representation and economic development under Siad Barre's administration. Memories of that regime, along with the general decentralized nature of Somali society, gave people reason to resist the imposition of a new central state under UN auspices. Somalis wanted a return to peace, but not necessarily state building along the Western model. In this respect, Aideed appeared to be a “legitimate” spoiler in the eyes of the populace. As I demonstrated in Chapter II, clan interests prevail over any notion of “national identity” in Somalia; support for a future centralized state could only be gained from the warlords and their followers if they perceived a benefit to their clan from it.¹⁶³ In order to deter

¹⁶¹ Kelly M. Greenhill and Solomon Major, “The Perils of Profiling: Civil War Spoilers and the Collapse of Intrastate Peace Accords,” *International Security* 31:3 (Winter 2006/2007), 7.

¹⁶² Clapham, 46-50.

¹⁶³ Menkhaus, 75-84.

Aided from spoiling a political settlement to the conflict, the interveners would have to consider a strategy that acknowledged his legitimate concerns about the peace process and include these considerations in the negotiations.

In the DRC, the presence of a spoiler in the form of Thomas Lubanga, when coupled with the structure of the political negotiations underway in 2002-2003, created a situation in which Lubanga could afford to be greedy. Political negotiations had reached a provisional settlement, meaning that the primary actors had been pressured by the international community into signing an agreement, but the practical results of the agreement were in flux. The final allocation of state power and resources had not been decided, as the country was in a transitional period based on future benchmarks in the political settlement process.¹⁶⁴ Joseph Kabila and the seven leaders of the major factions in the civil war were awarded positions in the transitional government ranging from president to vice-president and deputy, and their followers became ministers of parliament or government administrators. During the Inter-Congolese Dialogue and subsequent peace agreements, the relative strength of the factions – based on the size of their forces and territories – when they sat down to the negotiating table determined the level of position they attained in the transitional government.

The transitional government would serve as a temporary power-sharing agreement until national elections could be held in a few years. The timetable for the transitional government to be replaced by countrywide elections created a situation in which the included factions had incentives to use stalling tactics to delay progress toward elections, while the excluded factions had incentives to overturn the political settlement altogether in hopes of being included in a new one. Amongst both the included and excluded factions were “warmongers, who either had everything to lose with the peace or had too much to gain from war to accept a settlement of the conflict.”¹⁶⁵

Lubanga fit into this shell perfectly – as I discussed in Chapter III, he had nothing to gain from peace, as he had not been included in the negotiations due to his late entrance into the ranks of powerful rebel leaders. He also had much to gain from

¹⁶⁴ Clapham, 46-8.

¹⁶⁵ Autesserre, 10.

continued fighting, as it garnered him control over lucrative natural resources, labor, and increased social status in Ituri. If he allowed the Ituri Interim Administration to establish its control over the province, he would lose all of the gains he had won militarily over the last few years. With the Ugandan soldiers gone, he could continue to exploit the security vacuum in Ituri only as long as the transitional government did not succeed in establishing a presence in the East. Lubanga, being a rational actor, realized his tenuous position and decided to commit the forces at his command to laying siege to Bunia. While he may have simply been attempting to hang onto his power base in Ituri, he may also have seen that the growing insecurity in the East would jeopardize the forward momentum of the political settlement in Kinshasa. If his continued fighting contributed to dissolving the peace process, he would be opening a path to greater political and economic power for his own faction at the national level. At the very least, Lubanga was determined to hang onto his role as a major player in Ituri, and would commit all his resources to that end. Lubanga's commitment to extending his power base throughout Ituri whenever and wherever he could, absent stiff resistance, made him a greedy spoiler who would have to be dealt with by the sponsors of the DRC peace process.

3. Strategies for Deterring Spoilers

In each of these case studies, an in-depth analysis of the characteristics of the spoiler problem and the dynamics of the conflict reveal where pressure needs to be applied in order to effectively deter the spoilers. Greedy spoilers like Aided and Lubanga, who will take what they can get out of the negotiating process, can often be dealt with by meeting their core demands and simultaneously reducing the opportunities for them to create impediments to conflict resolution throughout the negotiating process.¹⁶⁶ This strategy combines positive inducement, the offer of rewards in the political settlement, with coercion, the threat and use of punitive action against anyone who does not comply with the political settlement or breaks agreements made during the negotiating process. The effective balance between positive inducement and coercion depends greatly on the circumstances of the conflict resolution process, and may not be readily apparent due to the shifting dynamics of the negotiating process. Stedman calls

¹⁶⁶ Greenhill and Major, 9.

this strategy socialization, as it is used to shape spoilers' attitudes toward the peace process and induce compliance with a political settlement that is underway.¹⁶⁷

An important factor in a strategy of socialization is recognizing the balance of power that prevails on the ground at the time political negotiations occur. Because greedy spoilers will demand as many concessions from the political negotiations as they can get away with based on their military dominance, the opportunity structure of the negotiations must be shaped to offer them a better deal in peace than in war. Throughout the entire negotiating process, both real and potential spoilers are constantly analyzing their decision calculus, weighing the risks versus gains from continuing the conflict.¹⁶⁸ Positive inducement, or concessions, may be included in the process to reward compliant behavior on the part of the parties to the conflict. This may include agreement to recognize the grievances that had provoked one or another party to turn to armed struggle, such as guarantees of social equality for a party's ethnic group in a new state constitution, or an ethnic quota system for a new parliament. Depending on the root causes of any particular conflict, many meaningful rewards may be devised to appeal to the parties to the conflict and give them a reason to prevent continued violence.

Rewards alone, however, may not keep the actors on track in the peace process. Once rewards have been promised, actors could become greedy spoilers and either demand further concessions or default on their promises altogether in the hope that they will win greater rewards from prolonging the conflict. This is where coercion comes into play in the strategy for deterring greedy spoilers. According to Stedman, coercion "relies on the use or threat of punishment to deter or alter unacceptable spoiler behavior or reduce the capability of the spoiler to disrupt the peace process."¹⁶⁹ If positive inducement were the carrot, coercion would be the stick. Coercion both provides a negative inducement (the threat of punishment) to guarantee compliance to political agreements, as well as active enforcement of a political settlement if a spoiler chooses to ignore the threat and reneges on his promises. Coercion prevents one actor's intransigence from reigniting the conflict and spoiling the entire peace process.

¹⁶⁷ Stedman, 19.

¹⁶⁸ Greenhill and Major, 8-11.

¹⁶⁹ Stedman, 13.

Coercion, as a tool, must maintain the opportunity structure, based on the balance of power on the ground, in place when the actors began political negotiations.¹⁷⁰ When factions finally agree to sit down at the negotiating table and consider resolving their conflict politically, it is because they have reached a “hurting stalemate” in the conflict: they believe that they have more to gain from a political settlement than from prolonged violence because they are not winning the armed conflict.¹⁷¹ When a “hurting stalemate” has been achieved, the factions are “ripe” for a negotiated settlement, but if the negotiations unravel or the implementation of a peace agreement fails, the factions are said to “unripen.”¹⁷² In other words, greedy spoilers are quick to sense the vulnerabilities of peace agreements and their subsequent implementation. Decisions that they had made a few months (or years) ago may seem counterproductive to them later on as their relative situations change. If the pressures that brought actors to the negotiating table are withdrawn, they may attempt coercion of their own against the interveners in order to reshape the contours of the negotiations to their benefit.

Coercion is used to persuade potential spoilers that they will not succeed in such an endeavor. When spoilers attempt to limit the implementation of a peace agreement, a viable peace enforcement operation becomes necessary to maintain the “hurting stalemate” and prevent any spoiler faction from becoming too powerful. Once an agreement has been reached, but has not been fully implemented, the factions face a kind of collective security dilemma in which a strong faction that defects stands to profit at the expense of the other factions. Only a strong, credible peace enforcement intervention will be able to confront such greedy spoilers and prevent the dismantling of the peace agreement. At the very least, an effective intervention must be able to tackle the military capabilities that the spoiler uses to renew fighting.¹⁷³

Credibility was a vital factor in the strategies used by Operations Restore Hope and Artemis. Operation Restore Hope could have provided a highly credible intervention

¹⁷⁰ Greenhill and Major, 13.

¹⁷¹ William Zartman, ed., *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995), 18.

¹⁷² Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse, and Hugh Miall, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution* (Cambridge: Polity, 2005), 167.

¹⁷³ Greenhill and Major, 13-21.

force, but in contrast to Artemis, Restore Hope's disconnect with ongoing negotiations for a political settlement prevented it from deterring spoilers. UNITAF's insistence on operating under a mandate for humanitarian relief operations, rather than providing peace enforcement in line with the Addis Ababa political negotiations, only served to strengthen the spoilers rather than deter them. From the outset, UNITAF negotiated directly with Aideed to enable its peaceful entrance into Mogadishu, subverting the multiparty talks sponsored by the UN. Because of the U.S.'s desire to avoid confrontation, UNITAF required at least the passive consent of Aideed to operations within his sub-clan's considerable territory. UNITAF's arrival in Mogadishu buoyed Aideed's status at the Addis Ababa I negotiations in January 1993, at the same time that the UN seemed to support Mahdi as the legitimate leader of Somalia.

According to spoiler theory, the optimal course of action for intervening in Somalia would have been to maintain the balance of power that prevailed when negotiations had started in earnest. In fact, this issue proved paramount for Aideed; the UN's reluctance to recognize his military superiority over Mahdi and provide him with proportionate positive inducement during the negotiating process prompted Aideed to push for the international intervention's withdrawal from Somalia altogether. The UN had not succeeded in negotiating a political settlement before the arrival of peace enforcement operations, so the warlords continued to vie for power in order to improve their bargaining positions in any future agreement. While Mahdi appeared to be negotiating in good faith, this could have been more a result of his military inferiority than his desire for peaceful resolution to the conflict. UNITAF's overwhelming force threatened to negate Aideed's military superiority vis-à-vis Mahdi, robbing Aideed of outright victory in the conflict in Mogadishu. UNITAF's arrival forced Aideed to the negotiating table, but its unwillingness to maintain the balance of power between the warlords' forces made impartiality in the peace process illusory.¹⁷⁴

UNITAF's presence altered the balance of power in Mogadishu at a time when the two warlords were not prepared to agree to a comprehensive political settlement. Aideed was clearly stronger than Mahdi, so by stopping the fighting, the UN-sponsored

¹⁷⁴ Clapham, 51-2.

peace process appeared partial to Mahdi. Aideed, in reaction, impeded UNITAF's freedom of movement and limited its effectiveness unless it deferred to him for negotiated access. It is possible that the balance of power between the two warlords could have been maintained, and thus the political process moved forward, by UNITAF using its strength to enforce disarmament of all the factions. If UNITAF had embraced a disarmament mandate, as pressured to do so by the UN, its credible threat of force could have reinforced the political process instead of working against it. However, UNITAF did not do so, and Aideed succeeded with his stalling tactics throughout the negotiating process.¹⁷⁵

As UNITAF was preparing to leave, the UN called for disarmament of the factions as negotiated in Addis Ababa II. UNOSOM II, much weaker militarily than UNITAF had been, would have to attempt to enforce disarmament of Aideed's militia. Mahdi appeared to comply more readily, possibly because he was more invested in the negotiations and could readily obtain replacement weapons on the black market if negotiations soured. Aideed, in contrast, seemed to prefer not to lose his military superiority and viewed disarmament as a direct attack against his power base. Following the attacks on UN peacekeepers during the summer of 1993, the UN shifted its focus toward reprisals against Aideed and called for his arrest. Raids against his caches and compounds resulted in civilian deaths and only served to strengthen his image in Somalis' hearts and minds. The UN's strategy for attempting to deter Aideed as a spoiler changed from socialization to complete neutralization. Regardless of the merits of this new strategy, UNOSOM II did not offer the credible threat of force to back it up. The enforcement of disarmament as part of a wider political settlement may have been successful with UNITAF's overwhelming military pressure, but not after Operation Restore Hope had ended. As a result, Aideed came to consider the UN-sponsored peace process as a direct threat to his survival and he retreated completely from comprehensive negotiations. Without effective enforcement, disarmament failed in Mogadishu and the hopes for a political settlement died.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷⁵ Donald C.F. Daniel and Bradd C. Hayes, *Coercive Inducement and the Containment of International Crises* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999), 84-96.

¹⁷⁶ Daniel and Hayes, 92-103.

The Somalia case study provides a clear example of how coercive inducement, as a strategy to deter spoilers, backfires when a partial response from a peace enforcement operation alters the balance of power and thus elicits non-cooperation from the factions.¹⁷⁷ By refusing to coordinate its mission with the political negotiations underway in Addis Ababa, UNITAF attempted to preserve its neutrality at the cost of the wider UN intervention. When UNOSOM II later tried to conduct disarmament, as called for under Addis Ababa II, its military weakness and lack of credibility led to escalated fighting in Mogadishu and no disarmament. The UN's role as mediator in the conflict was irrevocably compromised by UNOSOM II's disproportionate reprisals against Aideed, leading to the UN's complete withdrawal from Somalia by 1995. Alternatively, a workable solution could have been continued UN mediation toward a political settlement, reinforced by a peace enforcement operation led by a strong outside coalition.¹⁷⁸ If UNITAF had been properly linked to the UN's political negotiations, Operation Restore Hope could have provided a credible deterrent to Aideed. Instead, Operation Restore Hope's limited mandate, lack of coordination with the political negotiations in Addis Ababa I and II, and perceived partiality only served to strengthen the warlord spoilers instead of deterring them.

Artemis proved its credibility in the eyes of the spoiler Lubanga by presenting a force with the military strength and willpower to undercut his ability to wage war in Ituri. As discussed above, Lubanga sought to maintain and expand his territorial control in Ituri in order to force his way into the political negotiations at the national level. If the transitional government for the DRC or its constituent Ituri Interim Administration got underway, he would be permanently frozen out of a position of power in the post-conflict environment. He had not been included in the negotiations in Kinshasa because he had not been a significant player in the balance of power between the warlords in 1999, when

¹⁷⁷ Kofi A. Annan, "Challenges of the New Peacekeeping," in *Peacemaking and Peacekeeping for the New Century*, ed. Olara A. Otunnu and Michael W. Doyle (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998), 175.

¹⁷⁸ James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Neotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak States," *International Security* 28:4 (Spring 2004), 21; John Hillen, *Blue Helmets: The Strategy of UN Military Operations* (Washington, DC: Brassey's, 2000), 168.

the peace process began. His refusal to disarm and withdraw from Bunia, and his propensity for confronting overwhelmed UN peacekeepers there, required a *credible* peace enforcement mission to deter him.

Whereas MONUC had proven itself non-credible at deterring Lubanga, Artemis demonstrated its credibility by bringing sufficient resources to bear against him. The IEMF's logistical superiority, special forces, and close air support assets, as discussed in Chapter III, allowed Artemis to overwhelm Lubanga's forces and force their retreat from Bunia. Artemis also demonstrated its resolve to use force, when necessary, to handicap Lubanga's military strengths by removing his weapons caches in the "weapons-free zone" around Bunia. The European Union provided a coalition of forces that was clearly stronger than Lubanga's militia, as well as committed to retaliating against his provocations – both key ingredients in an effective coercion strategy to deter spoilers.¹⁷⁹ In doing so, Artemis prevented Lubanga's greedy spoiler tactics from impeding the establishment of the Ituri Interim Administration and the country's progress toward an elected government. His encroachments into the balance of power that had held sway during the political negotiations from 1999-2002 were effectively rebuffed, and his power base in Ituri undermined.

Artemis's credibility was enhanced by its coordination with the peace process. Bringing sufficient forces to bear at the wrong time and/or wrong place would have had no effect on deterring Lubanga or other spoilers. Artemis concentrated specifically on Bunia, the capital of Ituri, in the summer of 2003 because this was a critical juncture in the entire peace process for the DRC. The Luanda and Sun City agreements, to be implemented, required a stabilized Ituri. Lubanga assaulted Bunia for that very reason, knowing that he could prevent the implementation of the agreements by impeding the Ituri Interim Administration. If he had not been confronted effectively before the autumn, which was the earliest that MONUC could be properly reinforced to do so, he would have effectively spoiled progress toward a comprehensive political settlement to the conflict in the DRC. The strength that Artemis demonstrated on the ground at this key point in time allowed for a turning point in the conflict – Bunia was stabilized and

¹⁷⁹ Greenhill and Major, 39.

MONUC had the breathing room it needed to regroup and form the Ituri Brigade to stabilize the rest of Ituri and Eastern DRC. The consistent use of military pressure against spoilers is necessary to keep negotiations moving forward, and ratcheting that pressure up in the face of a specific challenge is an effective strategy for deterring them.¹⁸⁰ Artemis provided that increased military pressure – a highly credible threat to Lubanga’s spoiling tactics – at a key juncture in the peace process, preventing him from irrevocably impeding its forward momentum.

In both case studies, the strategy devised to deter spoilers to the peace process was weighted heavily toward coercion. The UN deliberately excluded Lubanga from the power-sharing arrangement for the transitional government in the DRC due to his late arrival on the scene, when a political settlement had already been reached. The UN also seemed unwilling or unable to negotiate effectively with Aideed using the carrot approach, and failed to conclude a political settlement endorsed by his faction. Because of the lack of success with rewards or concessions, the weight of effort for deterring spoilers in these two cases rested with coercion. Peace enforcement operations needed to be employed in a highly credible manner in order to force compliance with the terms of a political settlement or ongoing negotiations. Only a strong peace enforcement mission could guarantee the implementation of the terms of political agreements, and stave off greedy spoilers like Aideed and Lubanga.

Today, Somalia appears to be as badly – if not worse – off than it was in 1992. Operation Restore Hope provided a small window of humanitarian relief for the starving people of Southern Somalia. Unfortunately, it failed to have any kind of lasting positive impact on the country, which remains plagued by malnutrition, displaced people, and catastrophic violence. While the names of the warlords may have changed, the conditions that prevailed in 1992 are unaltered. The suffering and deaths of the Somali people still stem from the brutal struggle for power between the warlords in Mogadishu and Southern Somalia. Operation Restore Hope, by failing to connect its potentially credible peace enforcement mission to the political settlement process, failed to deter spoilers like Aideed. Indeed, it accidentally strengthened them, and the endemic violence

¹⁸⁰ MG Patrick Cammaert (Commander, Eastern Division, United Nations Organization Mission in the DRC), in discussion with the author, 6 February 2007, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA.

in Somalia today is the result. No progress toward a political settlement to the conflict has occurred in the last sixteen years, and the Somalis who have survived the violence appear resolved to export their war to the rest of the Horn of Africa.

Operation Artemis, in contrast, provided highly credible peace enforcement, keeping the political settlements reached as part of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue on track despite spoiler provocations. Today, while hardly an oasis of stability in Africa, the DRC continues to make progress toward peace. Milestones in the peace process continue to be met, such as national elections in 2006. MONUC remains in the East, dealing with pockets of continued resistance from various factions and warlords. The DRC is not a role model for democracy or quality of life, but the chances of a Third Congo War are a lot more remote today than they were in 2003. Because Artemis effectively deterred spoilers like Lubanga in Bunia, the political settlement to the conflict in the DRC endures and progress toward a lasting peace continues.

B. POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Throughout this paper, I have examined how the ability of a peace enforcement operation to deter spoilers affects progress toward a political settlement to a given conflict. Interventions in the DRC and Somalia provide contrasting examples of success and failure in deterring spoilers, based on the strategy used in each case. Can the lessons from these two cases be applied to the vast number of other civil conflicts in Africa, or the world? I believe they can. While unique conditions may have existed in these cases that either favored or detracted from Operations Artemis and Restore Hope, the overarching formula for success gleaned from these cases can be applied generally to other countries. To effectively deter spoilers in a peace process, peace enforcement operations must be a credible threat to the spoilers, while at the same time intricately coordinated with the goals of the political settlement in progress.

For a multitude of reasons, the United Nations is generally unable to provide a highly credible peace enforcement mission when it is most desperately needed to tackle a crisis point in the conflict resolution process. It chronically suffers from a lack of troop contributions from its member states, command and control problems within the multinational force construct, and logistical shortfalls resulting in an extremely long

deployment timeline, to name just a few. The UN is widely regarded as a legitimate mediator in civil and/or interstate conflicts, and has proven its dedication to bringing the parties to a conflict to the bargaining table in hopes of reaching a political settlement and ultimately ending the conflict. The legitimacy needed to mediate a political agreement, however, can be different than that needed to enforce it once a spoiler emerges. In peace enforcement operations, the most relevant form of legitimacy lies in the *credibility* of the mission. While factions may consider a coalition peace enforcement operation somewhat more partial than a UN force, a capable operation will nonetheless be respected because of its military superiority. Absent a major shift in the force generation and projection capabilities of the UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations, this dynamic will prevail for the foreseeable future. When operating under a UN mandate, coalition peace enforcement operations benefit from both the UN's legitimacy and the coalition's military effectiveness.

In this light, the best option for a credible peace enforcement mission continues to be a Western-led coalition. Both Artemis and Restore Hope proved that such a coalition can deploy within weeks, rather than months in the case of the UN, when a peace process is in danger of collapse. Both operations also demonstrated how their superior military capabilities enabled them to complete their missions – while Restore Hope failed to deter Aideed, this was a question of mandate rather than capability. UNOSOM II, even augmented with U.S. Special Operations Forces, could not project a force credible enough to deter Aideed. Only with the resources available to European states or the U.S. could an operation like Artemis get underway, as demonstrated by the effectiveness of its logistics, special forces, and air support. Western states are simply unwilling to relinquish such close-held resources to UN control, and the UN is too unwieldy to bring them to bear effectively. If the Western member states of the United Nations are sincere about preserving political settlements to conflicts around the world, they must be willing to lead peace enforcement operations and commit their own troops and equipment. Ground truth indicates that a Western-led mission is taken more seriously by greedy spoilers like Aideed and Lubanga.

Not every peace process will require such a strong force; some political settlements are strong enough to be maintained by a much lighter peacekeeping force.

There is a key decision point here for future operations, and it revolves around the emergence of a spoiler to a political settlement. First, a peace enforcement mission must have a peace to enforce – without a political settlement in place before boots hit the ground, the mission’s mandate is open to interpretation and strong survival instincts impel the various factions to shape the changing security environment to their benefit. The act of introducing a heavily-armed force into a battlefield situation cannot help but sway the balance of power between factions. Without a mutually agreed framework outlining a future end-state, as detailed in a *concluded* political settlement, spoilers may continue to resist what they view as an imposed peace agreement.

Once a political settlement has been achieved, the interveners must determine whether or not an emerging spoiler constitutes an imminent threat to the peace process itself. Lubanga, for example, directly threatened the implementation of the Luanda Accord and the establishment of legitimate political leadership in the form of the IIA and the transitional government. The Spring of 2003 was a turning point in the peace process for the DRC, and the situation in Ituri had to be dealt with quickly and decisively in order to vouchsafe the political settlements of 2002. In such a case, the rapid deployment of a credible peace enforcement mission may require a Western-led coalition, as described above. In other types of cases, when potential spoilers can be effectively deterred by positive inducement or they do not constitute an existential threat to a political settlement, the UN peacekeepers already on the ground may suffice.

These lessons for deterring spoilers and preserving a political settlement to a conflict are not currently being applied. Despite the lack of a comprehensive political settlement in Darfur, the United Nations has committed thousands of troops to a new peace enforcement mission there. The bulk of the mission consists of re-hatted African Union troops who have previously failed to demonstrate a credible threat to spoilers in Darfur. Now, the various rebel factions, government-aligned factions, and the government in Khartoum all struggle to influence the course of any future political settlement while the UN mission is hopelessly impeded. In this case, the UN is confronted with a spoiler to the peace process in the form of the current government. The fact that its charter prohibits it from impinging on state sovereignty, thus restricting its

ability to tackle the government spoilers, means that the UN can provide neither a legitimate nor credible peace enforcement mission for Darfur.

In Somalia, the UN is also considering taking over the African Union peace enforcement mission, also absent a political settlement that has the support of the strongest factions. In both cases, an effective peace enforcement mission would require a credible force tied to a political settlement. Both of these conditions must be met for a peace enforcement operation to be capable of deterring spoilers and thus maintaining the forward momentum of a political settlement to the conflict.

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